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Market Reaction to Seasoned Offerings in China 
 
Abstract:    This study examines stock market reaction to the announcement of various forms 
of seasoned issues in China. Our empirical evidence demonstrates that market reactions differ 
in ways that suggest a difference between management’s internal assessment and the 
market’s assessment of the stock price. The market responds unfavourably to the 
announcement, notably in the case of rights issues and also with regard to open offers. Private 
placements experience an unfavourable pre-announcement reaction, which contrasts with the 
favourable reaction after the event. Convertible bond issues generate positive excess returns 
consistent with the market’s confidence that they can help to align management and 
shareholders’ interests.  Further investigation shows that market reaction is related to factors 
specific to the issuer and issue by reference to the period immediately surrounding the issue. 
Specifically, ownership concentration, agency matters connected with equity offerings, 
investor protection connected with fund allocation and security pricing, and the influence of 
powerful moneyed interests together provide an instructive insight into market reaction. 
Institutional inefficiency pertaining to underwriting, auditing, analysts’ forecasts and credit 
ratings are found to have a weak association with market price, consistent with due public 
scepticism concerning management and their gatekeepers. 
 
JEL classification: G12; G14; G32; G30 
Keywords: seasoned issues, equity offerings, market reaction, information, information 
asymmetry, agency costs, market infrastructure, China 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical studies have examined the firm’s financing decisions and the corresponding 
market price movements. Differences in price behaviour appear mainly to depend on the 
available information pertaining to forms of financing and the perceptions of the market with 
respect to the firm’s financing decision (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Within the body of 
theory, several studies have considered the market implications of security issues to new as 
opposed to existing investors, and also the types of issues that are subject to different degrees 
of regulatory discipline, obligations and incentives (Baker and Wurgler, 2000; Carlson et al., 
2006; DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz, 2010; Silva and Bilinski, 2015; Hovakimian and Hu, 
2016).  
     Information asymmetries impinge forcefully in terms of the signals conveyed when 
securities are issued.  The theory of information asymmetries posits that if managers seek to 
maximize their existing shareholders’ wealth, shares will be offered to the existing owners 
only when the management believe that the firm’s equity is undervalued (Myers and Majluf, 
1984; Jenter et al., 2011).  The price pressure hypothesis suggests that an unexpected equity 
issue may also drive down the price by signalling that the firm must make up for a shortfall in 
unobservable cash flow from operations (Fama and French, 2006; Slovin et al., 2000; 
Intintoli and Kahle, 2010).  The wealth transfer hypothesis proposes that an unexpected issue 
of equity reduces the risk of the firm’s outstanding debt leading to a wealth transfer from 
shareholders to bondholders with a net value loss for shareholders (Masulis, 1983; Elliott et 
al., 2009). The above foci of discussion have helped to generate interest in the comparative 
market reaction to the different forms of security issuance (e.g., Barnes and Walker, 2006). 
     In the case of open offers, a management which favours existing shareholders over new 
potential shareholders has an incentive to issue equity when shares are overvalued, especially 
when the firm goes public in a hot market (Gomes, 2001; Alti, 2006).  Issuing new shares 
increases the number of outsider shares, diluting the ownership stake and aggravating the 
potential conflict between managers and outside investors, and thereby constraining firm 
value accordingly (Ginglinger et al., 2012).  These impacts are less likely to occur if 
ownership is already highly concentrated (Slovin et al., 2000; Holderness, 2009). 
In contrast to open offers, private placements are typically offered to a group of 
sophisticated investors whose certification amounts to a positive signal by way of a quality 
seal (Wruck, 1989; Chakraborty and Gantchev, 2013), mitigating undervaluation problems, 
and averting the negative signals of public offerings (Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Wang, 2012).  
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They may, however, be vulnerable to agency problems associated with ownership 
concentration especially when ownership is already low (Wruck, 1989).   
In the case of rights issues, take-up can guard against ownership dilution or wealth transfer 
to new shareholders.  Hence, rights issues circumvent the agency costs associated with open 
offerings by mitigating the impact of asymmetric information problems and lowering 
transaction costs (Miller and Rock, 1985; Fama and French, 2006; Attig et al., 2006).   
Unlike the securities discussed above, convertible bonds entail contractual disciplines and 
constraints.  These can serve to allay market concerns that arise in respect of other forms of 
issuance, militating against asset substitution and adverse selection problems associated with 
plain equity sales (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stein, 1992).  
     Empirical evidence on price effects of equity issues was seminally analysed by Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). Subsequently, a number of other 
studies have extensively examined mature markets such as the US (Gao and Ritter, 2010; 
Henry and Koski, 2010; Alti and Sulaeman, 2012; Bradley and Yuan, 2013), the UK (Slovin 
et al., 2000; Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011; Iqbal, Akbar and Shiwakoti, 2013; Armitage, 
Dionysiou and Gonzalez, 2014; Silva and Bilinski, 2015), France (Ginglinger et al., 2012), 
Spain (Martín‐Ugedo, 2003; Alvarez and Gonzalez, 2005), Japan (Suzuki and Yamada, 
2012), Australia (Lamberto and Rath, 2010), and others.  Most of the recent studies in this 
area of research have been encouraged to a large extent by the increased interest in equity 
issues worldwide. It has been argued that reduced transaction costs and the globalisation of 
finance have encouraged firms to acquire equity finance in global financial markets (Kim and 
Weisbach, 2008). Research interest has been further stimulated by recent periods of the 
marked unpopularity of equity issues. This has occurred notably since 2000 both in the US 
and in Europe due, inter alia, to a tendency to favour merger as a means of rapid growth, and 
also because of low market valuation of companies after the collapse of the technology 
bubble and an increasingly onerous burden of regulation (Craig et al., 2010; Gao et al., 2013). 
     In recent years, security issuance in emerging markets has also attracted research attention 
(e.g., La Porta et al. 1999; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Cheng, Cheung and Tse, 2006; Ahmad-
Zaluki et al., 2007; Chen and Wang, 2007; Luo, Rao and Yue, 2010).  Findings differ 
distinctly across markets as well as overall between emerging and mature settings, especially 
when marked differences exist in respect of institutional and operational arrangements. These 
differences engender issues based on reputation, relationships and public policy in supporting 
financing channels particularly when market maturity is an aspiration (Allen et al., 2005).  
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China is a notable example here, due to its global importance and the evolving nature of its 
capital markets. 
    The salient characteristics of security issuance in China are consonant with the country’s 
evolving social, economic, and market status as well as the pervading presence of powerful 
influential groups.  The research takes due cognisance of important cultural influences which 
impinge on market mechanisms. All note agency problems consistent with an 
underdeveloped institutional infrastructure that is deficient in safeguards against 
informational asymmetries leading to security mispricing, the deliberate distortion of 
earnings, and the manipulation of the dividend profile in the period immediately surrounding 
security offerings.  These abuses can operate to the detriment of minority investors and other 
outsiders.  For instance, in the case of rights issues and open offers, the influence of agency 
costs associated with state ownership comes to bear (e.g., Shen and Xiao, 2001).  In the case 
of private placements, there are clearly visible signs of both manipulation of issue price in the 
run-up to the issue by the dominant controlling shareholders and also a propensity to post-
issue overinvestment (e.g., Yu, 2006). 
     While acknowledging the progress of the literature on security issuance, there remains 
scope for a further investigation and comparison of the distinct influences that come into play 
different methods of issuance.  Early work typically focuses on a single method of issuance 
for predicting market movements following the announcement without exploring the relative 
implications of a range of issuance methods for investors.  A number of studies  explore 
specific types of issue, for instance open offers (e.g., Slovin et al., 2000; Barnes and Walker, 
2006), rights offers (e.g., Martín‐Ugedo, 2003), private placements (e.g., Barclay et al., 
2007), and convertible bonds (e.g., Jong, Dutordoir and Verwijmeren, 2011; Lewis and 
Verwijmeren, 2014).  However, these fall short of offering a comparative perspective of the 
range of influence on market price exercised by the different methods of issuance. Control 
and discipline matters should be taken into account, including management’s ex-ante issue 
motives and decisions associated with different methods of issuance.  
     Earlier studies tend to confine themselves to a somewhat limited set of determinants.  
They give insufficient weight, if any, to the characteristics and perspectives of an issue, issuer 
and investors (e.g., Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005; Rantapuska and Knupfer, 2008).  It is 
necessary to acquiesce in a wide and inter-connected range of factors, paying due attention to 
the nature of the issue itself, the financial characteristics and outlook of the issuer, and the 
features specific to each type of security issuance. 
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     Our analytic design differs significantly from previous studies. We provide fresh insights 
by extending previous work concerned with market price movement surrounding a single 
type of seasoned issuance to an examination of all four types of seasoned issuance in China.  
Through our study, we seek to produce insights into an emerging market’s progress towards 
greater efficiency and completeness as well as into factors that both advance and retard such 
progress.  With respect to the context of seasoned issuance, we consider the extent to which 
the activities of influential market monitors and financial infrastructure builders are reflected 
in market reaction.   
     The above account of the scope of our work leads to the following formal research 
questions: (1) how does the market react to the different forms of seasoned issues?; and (2) 
which factors most powerfully explain the reactions which we observe? 
     In approaching our research questions, we firstly examine how the market reacts across 
the range of methods of seasoned issuance and their potential determinants by reference to 
1,810 seasoned issues in China from 1991 to 2010 inclusive.  We explore the relative impact 
of open offers, rights issues, private placements, and convertible bond issues and compare the 
demonstrated preferences of new as opposed to existing investors.  We also compare 
distinguishing influences that have a bearing on individual features of different forms of 
issuance which are subject to more as opposed to less regulatory discipline, obligations and 
incentives.  Our comparison enables us to observe the play of agency influences in a 
marketplace whose imperfections provide fertile soil for such influences. 
     Secondly, our study examines a range of factors that  explore ex ante metrics determining 
the market’s perception about the value of the new issue, the issue-related features driving 
idiosyncratic market reactions surrounding the announcement period, and those security-
specific characteristics associated with individual forms of issuance which promise to 
illumine operational arrangements, including management and monitoring matters. 
    Thirdly, we elected to study security issuance with reference to China. This decision was 
prompted by the fact that China is an emerging economy of global importance whose 
financial markets are permeated with a particularly large, complex and intriguing body of 
informational asymmetry problems.  Publicly listed firms in China have long experienced the 
consequences of dual classes of shareholding, unclearly defined property rights, and a lack of 
legal protection of minority shareholders’ rights. Participants in the market include rent-
seeking local governments, predatory corporations and dominant shareholders intent on 
pulling in money and misallocating funds ex post by various devices, notably in the form of 
related-party transactions directed at transferring wealth from minority shareholders to the 
dominant shareholders and the parent company (Aharony et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013). 
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Further, disclosure is far less comprehensive in China than in more mature markets. The 
resulting challenge extends to many aspects of financing.  For instance, Dedman et al. (2015) 
in their study of dividend policy well recognise the contentious problems presented by 
China’s market, with its limited transparency.  
     Our findings give us four fresh insights. First, we observe a negative reaction to both open 
offers and notably rights issues when the issue is announced.  Plain equity financing entails 
adverse-selection costs associated with the perceived unreliability of the underlying assets.  
Further, contrary to the certification argument, the unfavourable reaction received in the case 
of private placements in the pre-announcement period is consistent with outside minorities’ 
anticipation of exploitation in the form of price manipulation by the dominant controlling 
shareholders.  In the post-announcement period, the market is reassured by the strategic 
deployment of assets or cash by targeted investors.  In the convertible bond case, the market’s 
reaction is consistent with its opinion that a convertible can align management and 
shareholders’ interests especially when backed by powerful regulation.  Second, we find that 
ex ante measures which reflect the market’s pre-announcement predictions of the value of the 
new issue - manifested in growth opportunities, price run-up and dividend distribution policy 
–  feature significantly among the factors which are specific to the issuer and the type of 
security issuance. Within this overall set of findings, ownership concentration causes value 
losses in the offerings of equity where agency problems are predominant, but such problems 
impinge less in the case of convertible bond issues, due to both inherent disciplines and 
stringent regulation of convertible bonds in China.  Third, within the market mechanisms 
related to the issue, including underwriting, auditing and analysts, there arise agency matters 
in the period surrounding the announcement. Weak protection of shareholders appears in the 
form of security mispricing and market inefficiency in the provision of information to 
shareholders. These factors powerfully explain the different market reactions.  We find 
particularly instructive evidence of the significance of the intended use of issue proceeds 
most notably when these proceeds are committed to high-tech projects or projects which 
otherwise increase the real asset base. Fourth, with respect to features specific to the type of 
security, our study reveals that investors are vulnerable to misbehaviour associated with 
exploitative renunciations in the case of rights issues, price manipulation by controlling 
shareholders in the case of private placements, and ratings with limited signalling value in the 
case of convertible bonds.  
     We contribute to the literature in two respects.  By addressing comparatively the range of 
methods of seasoned issues, we identify how far distinct features of individual types of 
issuance appear to influence market reaction. A contribution of this different approach is its 
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basis that seasoned offerings differ in terms of market transparency and the efficacy of 
regulations and public credulity, thereby shaping the market perception of each individual 
issuance and accounting for the observed differences in market price movements.  Further, by 
analysing individually important determinants of market reaction for each issue and by 
relating these to investors and to the market as a whole, we produce new evidence of how far 
both informational asymmetries and free cash flow agency problems germane to security 
issuance determine differential market reactions. We suggest how dysfunctional 
misbehaviour at both the institutional and individual levels can be effectively controlled and 
governed by explicit and implicit disciplines in the context of a non-perfect market such as 
China.  Our empirical analyses provide a more realistic view of how the market, issuers and 
investors interact in the issuing process, and hence identify new implications for capital 
market regulators and participants. 
     The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses security issuance 
and the institutional background in China. Section 3 sets out and discusses the methodology 
and develops the hypotheses.  Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes 
and provides policy implications. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
With the establishment of the two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1991, 
Chinese firms gained an additional financing channel, and equity finance has since become 
the main instrument for firms seeking new funds.  Chinese firms intending to undertake a 
seasoned issue of securities can essentially choose among rights issues, open offers, private 
placements, and convertible bonds under the existing regulation. 
(i) Rights Issues 
A distinctive feature of rights issues is that they have the power to maintain ownership 
balance.  This feature influenced China’s government to introduce rights issues in 1992 as a 
seminal substantive step.  However, China differs from virtually every other market with 
respect to the renunciation of rights.  In the U.S., the proceeds of renounced rights are 
distributed to shareholders by managers of the issue. In the UK, entitlements that are 
renounced are commonly placed with an intermediary or directly with other investors.  The 
transfer of rights was allowed in China during the period 2000 to 2001, but soon scrapped 
due to improper trading in the secondary market, which severely damaged investors’ 
confidence.   
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     Rights issues are subject to distinctive regulation whereby issuing firms are required to 
meet three basic accounting criteria set out by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC).  First, in terms of profitability, there must normally be a record of the certified net 
profit for three consecutive years and average return on equity (ROE) of no less than 10 
percent.  Second, in terms of issue size and frequency of issuance, the number of new shares 
is strictly limited to 30 percent of the firm’s existing share capital in the year prior to the 
issuing year, and two consecutive offerings cannot be made in two consecutive accounting 
periods. A third criterion makes offerings subject to best-effort agreement. However, there is 
no restriction on the discount on the subscription price and the benchmarking date for pricing. 
     Rights issues in China also differ from the case of mature markets, where rights issues are 
frequently used to reduce gearing, especially when bad times generate over-borrowing. In 
China, rights issuers frequently pay scant attention to the optimal corporate capital structure 
and accountability to shareholders (Liu et al., 2013).  Ownership of companies is dominated 
by the state, resulting in a capital market that is under the tight control of the government 
with state ownership accounting for more than 60 percent. Ownership dilution is accordingly 
relatively less important than in conventional mature markets. The state-controlling 
shareholders frequently propose rights offers, but opt later to give up the pre-emptive rights 
or not fully subscribing their rights. Minority shareholders who are hard put to prevent an 
issue suffer to the extent that part of the funds raised tends to be dysfunctionally deployed 
rather than being invested in beneficial projects (Shleifer, 1998). Further, rights are usually 
sold at a discount in favour of state shareholders with a controlling stake to the detriment of 
minority shareholders.  These factors combine to cause loss of value for public shareholders, 
thereby impairing public trust.   
 
(ii) Open Offers  
Open offers were initiated in 1994 on an experimental basis.  As compared to rights issues, 
open offers to the general public and institutions are subject to less strict issue criteria.  The 
CSRC requires a record of the certified net profit for three years preceding the issuance with 
an average ROE of at least 6 percent.  In particular, there is no restriction on the quantity of 
cash which can be raised in a single issue.  As a consequence, open offers have become 
greater in value than rights issues. Table A1 shows that open offers became increasingly 
popular from 2000 until 2008, when the share-split structure reform had been completed. 
     With respect to pricing, the subscription price in open offers must not be discounted by 
more than the average market price of 20 trading days prior to the benchmarking day or the 
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average market price of the last day prior to the announcement of the letter of intent. This 
guards against issuing artificially and manipulatively priced holdings to powerful applicants, 
some of whom are able to access loans from connected sources.  In an evolving market that 
aspires to gain a reputation for order and stability, substantial intentional discounting would 
undesirably lead to speculative and insider stagging opportunities, and published flotation 
information would be discredited as a consequence. 
     The issue requirements have been subject to frequent revision by the CSRC. Although the 
CSRC later tightened the issue criteria, including the restriction on issue size, these criteria 
remain less restrictive than those applied to rights issues. Hence open offers are vulnerable 
and lend themselves to manipulation for the purpose of raising large amounts of discretionary 
cash.  Funds drawn from the market are maliciously pooled and channelled into projects that 
bear little or no relation to the destination set forth in the prospectus – sometimes into fake or 
fictitious investments.  Some projects, even though bearing managerial approval, fall victim 
to uneconomic issue costs and market underperformance (Liu et al., 2013). 
(iii) Convertible Bond Issues 
Convertible bonds were formally introduced in 1998. The authorities administer them and 
their regulation is markedly strict.  The CSRC stipulates that (1) the minimum issue amount 
should be 100 million yuan; (2) total debt balance should not exceed 40 percent of the firm's 
net assets; (3) net assets should be no less than 2.5 billion yuan; and (4) the firm must have 
maintained a record of positive profitability with an ROE of no less than 10 percent for three 
consecutive years. Initially, convertible bond issues were confined to state-owned enterprises 
that meet the criteria with respect to the minimum issue amount, ROE, profitability, total 
assets and debt-equity ratio. Preference was afforded to firms operating in the fields of 
energy, raw materials, and infrastructure as well as to key national enterprises.  In 2001, 
permission to issue convertible bonds was extended from state-owned enterprises to all listed 
firms, together with additional stringent criteria on capital adequacy and guarantees: the 
issuer must have guarantors with joint and several liability or an asset-backed pledge; issuers 
shall have convertible bonds rated initially at the time of issue and thereafter annually by a 
qualified credit rating agency.  This finally became a requirement for all issues in 2006.  Due 
to these restrictions, convertible bonds are confined to large issues by creditable companies. 
     Despite strict regulation aimed at governing and ensuring quality and credibility of issuers, 
abuses of process can and do arise in the form of the same personal, uneconomic “money 
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collecting”, which already exists in open offers and rights issues.1 Thus, convertible bond 
issues must be monitored by regulators to prevent dysfunctional discretionary behaviour on 
the part of management. 
 
(iv) Private Placements 
Private placements were only introduced in 2005 at the time of the launch of the share-split 
structure reform. They are confined either to a group of controlling shareholders or to 
institutional shareholders with a view to restructuring assets or obtaining fresh cash for 
investment to facilitate the process of state-ownership restructuring.  The accounting-based 
regulations on private placements are less strict than those associated with any other methods 
of issuance in terms of financial performance and audited reports.  The CSRC only requires a 
record of net profit for one year preceding the issuance, according to Measures for the 
Administration of Issuance of Securities by Listed Companies (2006), and the Interim 
Measures for Supervision and Management/Administration of Private Placements (2014).  
This is far below the requirements laid down for offers to existing shareholders or to general 
public.  There are no restrictions on the subscription quotas for investors, and greater 
flexibility regarding the choice of benchmarking dates for the subscription price, board 
meetings, shareholder applications and the process of issuance.  In addition, there are no 
mandatory requirements concerning dividend record or post-issue operational performance, 
as is the case for other methods of issuance.  This lenient regulation has encouraged issues by 
firms seeking to inject sound assets through mergers and acquisitions, or issues by firms with 
poor performance, or that are under threat of failure and so in need of strategic cash.  Private 
placements quickly became the most widely-used financing vehicle for raising equity capital. 
As shown in Table A1, private placements are implemented far more frequently and in larger 
volume than any other methods of issuance. 
                                                 
1.   Largely encouraged by the Chinese Government’s policy in support of stock market expansion and the less demanding 
issue criteria introduced in 2006, an increasing number of firms developed ambitious plans to raise new funds at the 
beginning of 2008. Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd., which is the second largest insurer in China, 
announced its intention to raise 160 billion Yuan through the issuance of 1.2 billion new shares and 41.2 billion Yuan 
convertible bonds in January 2008. This was claimed to be one of the world’s largest ever issues of this type of security. 
Following their example, 43 firms unveiled issue packages totalling 204.3 billion Yuan in a single month. This high 
frequency unnerved investors who feared corporate exploitation of the government’s policy by seizing more money. 
Investors dumped the shares of these firms amid panic selling, triggering a plunge in the stock market. The Shanghai 
Composite Index dropped by 17 percent within 10 trading days following the announcements. The spate of issue plans 
was dubbed “SEOgate”―the worst episode of “pulling money from the market” witnessed in China since 1992 (Tan, 
2008). This destroyed investors’ confidence almost irreparably. In order to rectify this situation, in 2008, the CSRC 
issued a series of regulations to improve information disclosure, strengthen the implementation of the legal 
responsibilities of the parties concerned, ensure the continuation of the dividend distribution system and reform the 
sponsorship system to safeguard shareholders’ interests. 
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     The accounting regulations, however, require that the subscription price must not be 
below 90 percent of the average market price in the 20 trading days prior to the benchmark 
day.  Placements for the purpose of company reorganisation must be at no less than the 
average market price in the 20 trading days before the record date.  Unlike in mature markets 
where purchasing firms typically comprise arm’s length collective investors, purchasers in 
China normally comprise the controlling shareholders or the parent company of the issuing 
firm.  It is commonly observed that private placement shares are sold at a premium to 
institutional investors but at a discount to the controlling shareholders and the parent 
company (Wu et al., 2010).  The certification effect associated with private placements in 
mature markets may accordingly not hold for China’s market, since the allocation to the 
controllers and the parent could offset the benefit of any certification effect (Slovin et al., 
2000).  Furthermore, the absence of a strict benchmark date is often accompanied by insider 
trading and the transfer of benefits from minority shareholders to controlling shareholders 
(Yu, 2006).  
    It is clear from the above discussion that the institutional context of China differs from 
mature, more efficient markets with respect to the motivation, initiation, management and 
monitoring of security offerings and the resulting interactions among regulators and players 
in the market. In particular, in the case of rights offering, the issuers are predominantly state-
owned.  The largest shareholders typically initiate rights offerings, but opt to give up the pre-
emptive rights or do not fully subscribe to their rights.  Opportunistically available cash is 
often harvested without serious consideration of prospective returns or is channelled into 
related-party transactions, and investors in many cases register their concern by making a 
poor response to the issue.  Open offers frequently exploit timing opportunities and are 
accompanied by personal activities that depart from shareholder wealth maximisation.  
Issuers alter the usage of proceeds from that specified in the prospectus, and proceeds may be 
deployed non-productively (Liu et al., 2013).  Private placements are commonly linked to 
controlling shareholders’ entrenched positions to the detriment of minority shareholders.  The 
management attempt to cut the costs of purchasing new shares for the controlling 
shareholders by timing and manipulating listing suspension prior to the placement 
announcement (Wu et al., 2010).  Convertible bonds are subject to strict accounting 
regulation and public scrutiny. However, to a lesser extent than other forms of issuance, they 
remain vulnerable to becoming routes to personal, uneconomic “money collecting”. 
     In an attempt to rein in abuses of the issue process and other rent-seeking behaviours 
associated with fundraising, the government has introduced a series of accounting-based 
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security regulations and policies since 1994, and the new regulations have helped to curb 
money collecting and selection problems (Chen and Wang, 2007). Nevertheless, these 
regulations do not invariably carry the full force of law.  Their moral authority is under 
constant challenge, such that violations are common and the perpetrator may suffer as a result 
of future incredulity on the part of the market (Liu et al., 2013).  Although the Securities Law 
and Company Law have enacted sanctions against wrongdoing, these are not clearly defined 
in the ordinances.  The weak and inefficient regulatory institutions and market environment 
further hinder the enforcement of laws and regulations.  Between 1994 and 2006, the CSRC 
listings rules were revised ten times in an attempt to prevent abuses of the issue process and 
rent-seeking behaviours referred to above.  Nevertheless, controlling shareholders and parent 
companies continue to embezzle subsidiaries’ funds by raising equity by means of seasoned 
issuance, to the detriment of minority shareholders.  Under an incomplete mechanism for 
shareholder meetings, it remains difficult for minority shareholders to monitor the extent to 
which funds are deployed for the benefit of firm value. 
     In summary, financing misbehaviour is rooted in the state-controlled ownership structure, 
ineffective legal protection for minority shareholders, weak supervisory institutions, and a 
predilection among certain private investors for short-term irrational gambling on shares.  
Furthermore, regulatory weakness and informational opacity together increase the risk of the 
misallocation of funds.  Results are manipulated and under-reported in the personal interests 
of promoters and intermediaries who are able to exert effective pressure to bear, even on 
supervisory bodies, including auditors. A particular dysfunctional impact of these 
imperfections is to undermine trust in the market by deterring long-term, sophisticated 
institutional and international investors on whom the market’s future success depends.   
  
3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
(i) Data and Sample Selection 
We analyse 1,810 registered seasoned issues conducted by domestic companies listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 1991 and 2010 
inclusive. We collect information regarding seasoned issues from the Seasoned Equity 
Offerings Database and China’s Bond Market Database. We obtain other data for Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) analysis and multiple variable analysis from China’s Stock Market 
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Database and the Accounting Research Database.
2
  The intended use of proceeds as stated at 
the time of the announcement is derived from the Wind Financial Terminal and checked in 
the official newspaper, China Securities Times.  We include all firms that have been delisted 
from the stock exchanges to avoid survival bias, but exclude any firm with a seasoned 
offering that does not have a CSRC report of the filing or of an announcement of intention to 
issue.  To avoid information contamination by other simultaneous corporate events, we 
exclude certain events occurring within 20 days either side of the announcement of the issue.  
Such potentially confounding events include the annual report, interim report, corporate 
restructuring, merger and takeover bids, earnings reports, dividends, stock splits, market 
buybacks, and suspension or delisting from the official listing.   After screening for such 
confounding events, the final sample consists of 1,659 seasoned issues, comprising 974 rights 
issues, 239 open offers, 375 private placements and 71 convertible bond issues. 
     To examine how the market interprets the various types of seasoned issue announcement, 
the issuing firms are disaggregated into open offer firms (OO-firms), private placement firms 
(PP-firms), rights issue firms (RI-firms), and firms issuing convertible bonds (CV-firms).  
This grouping enables us to examine significant differences such as those implied by the 
Myers and Majluf (1984) signalling-based model concerning issues to new as opposed to 
existing investors as well as issues to public as opposed to targeted investors. The grouping 
further enables us to examine differences such as those implied by agency debate concerning 
the distinguishing features of plain equity issues and issues in the context of convertible 
bonds. 
     The theoretical discussion in the literature and the distinctiveness of security issuance in 
the case of China, as discussed, lead us to the expectation that the market will react 
negatively to rights issues and open offers. It is expected that private placements will likewise 
result in a negative reaction in the period leading up to the announcement owing to the 
agency costs which result from price manipulation through the power of self-seeking 
controlling shareholders.  A positive reaction may follow the announcement as the market is 
reassured by the quality of strategic investment by targeted investors. In the case of 
convertible bond issues, we expect a positive reaction to the extent that the market anticipates 
                                                 
2.  These databases have been developed by the Centre for China Financial Research of the University of Hong Kong and 
by Guo Tai An Information Technology Ltd. 
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the benefits of strict regulation and contractual discipline. 
 
(ii) Events Study Methods   
 
We adopt a modified risk-adjusted market model to examine the impact of the four types of 
issue announcement on short-term market price movement.  We use the value-weighted 
Composite Index of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the market return for the 
companies listed on the respective stock exchanges.  We define the issue announcement date 
for each type of issuance according to the CSRC regulatory requirements.  For rights issues 
and open offers, the announcement dates correspond to the first public announcements of the 
intention to raise equity capital by way of rights and open offers.  Under the CSRC listing 
requirements, an issuer is required to announce promptly both its intention to make an issue 
and its chosen method of issuance.  For private placements, the announcement date 
corresponds to the announcement of the board meeting date.  For convertible bonds, the 
announcement date is deemed to be the date of the publication of the issue. The daily risk-
adjusted abnormal return (AR) is calculated as follows: 
)( ,,, tmiititi RRAR                                (1) 
where tiAR ,  is the abnormal return on stock i on day t; Ri,t is the daily actual or realised stock 
return adjusted for reinvested cash dividends; Rm.t is the daily value-weighted market returns 
with cash dividends reinvested on the index of the stock exchange where the issuing firm is 
listed; and t is the number of days that elapse before (–) or after (+) the issue is announced.  
The coefficients, i  and i , are ordinary least squares estimates of the intercept and the 
slope for stock i.  We estimate the model coefficients using 240 daily stock return 
observations starting from 300 to 61 days prior to the issue announcement date as defined for 
each type of issuance. The Ri represents a theoretical value growth of a stock holding over a 
specified period, assuming that all dividends are re-invested to purchase additional stocks at 
the price on the ex-dividend day. 
    Further, we construct the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as the sum of the abnormal 
returns over the event window around the announcement date.  Abnormal returns are 
generated for the five-day event window: two days before the announcement date to two days 
after it [–2, +2].  This period is considered to be sufficiently long to compensate for any 
major delayed responses after the announcement date, while being sufficiently short to 
minimise the number of confounding events.  We have conducted tests for various event 
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windows including two, three, five and ten days surrounding the announcement period. The 
results show that the five-day event window has the highest t-statistic value (see Table 2).  
Hence, we report results for the five-day event window.  Event period CARs are thus 
computed as: 



T
t
titi ARCAR
1
,,                                (2) 
where tiCAR ,  
is the cumulative abnormal return of share i from date t to date T. 
    We construct reference portfolios in addition to a market portfolio as a benchmark for 
calculating abnormal returns. We construct the reference portfolios with firm size and M/B 
ratio based on the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.  For a given year, size is the 
annual reported market value, and M/B ratio is the annual reported market-to-book ratio.  To 
construct the reference portfolios in year t, we first divide the firms into two groups according 
to the firm’s market capitalisation (size ranking). Each group is then divided into three 
subgroups according to the M/B ratio (value ranking).  We then calculate the average annual 
return of each subgroup.  SMB and HML are calculated as "small cap minus big" and "high 
B/M minus low" to measure the historic excess returns of small size caps and "value" stocks 
over the market as a whole. 
    To test the significance of tiAR ,  and tiCAR , , we compute the standardised residual t-test 
(SRT) based on Bohren et al. (1997).  We employ standardised abnormal returns to prevent 
AR and CAR with large variances dominating the test. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
(i) Abnormal Return and Cumulative Abnormal Return Analysis 
Table 1 reports daily abnormal returns (ARs) surrounding the announcement for the four 
types of seasoned offerings.  Distinctive price adjustment patterns emerge.  For rights issues, 
the daily abnormal returns are negative in the interquartile range (the 25
th
 percentile to the 
75
th
 percentile) of –0.14% to –0.06% prior to the announcement. The decision to announce a 
rights offering after a period of significant and negative market returns signals the market’s 
anticipation of the activities of the dominant controlling shareholders whose primary 
intention is to collect cash from the market with little intention of taking up their rights.  This 
market expectation triggers significant negative price reactions accordingly. 
     Upon the announcement, the price drops by 0.50% to –0.63%.  The dominant or otherwise 
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influential shareholders habitually surrender their subscription rights after the issue 
announcement with a renunciation rate reaching 90.76% as shown in Table 4. The price drop 
confirms the prior-market anticipation of cash-siphoning behaviour on the part of self-
serving controlling shareholders.  The daily abnormal returns then remain at the new low 
level in the interquartile range of –0.20% to –0.07%, and it appears to take time for the 
market to revert to its original level.  This lengthy recovery indicates a lack of confidence in 
the market caused by a well–founded anticipation of the commonly observed phenomenon of 
fund allocation by state controllers in the form of related-party transactions and intra-group 
transfers.  The negative reaction to rights issues in China does not support the conventional 
wisdom concerning managerial opportunism with respect to mispricing achieved by timing 
the issue (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Rather our results provide evidence of an aversion to a 
form of issuance beset by behaviour which militates against the interests of public 
subscribers. 
     The market price effects for open offers during the pre-announcement period contrast with 
those for rights issues but similar patterns occur during the post-announcement period.  Open 
offers evince significant upward movements in price in the interquartile range of –0.21% to 
0.43% prior to the announcement.  The price adjustments in advance of the announcement 
are consistent with the timing hypothesis whereby rational managers create new issues when 
the shares appear to be over–priced.  In reality, according to our data, managers have 
considerable flexibility when timing the issue, since 0.91% of the offerings occur after a 
positive price run-up over trading days –30 to –2 (not shown).  In response, the market 
lowers its valuation of the shares by 0.98% upon the announcement, and much of the positive 
announcement effect then erodes by way of a subsequent rundown in price.  The daily 
abnormal returns settle at the new low level in the interquartile range of –0.26% to –0.05%.  
Such post-announcement reactions reflect managerial opportunism and agency influences.  
Free cash flow increases following equity issues. Opportunities for misdirection and the 
withdrawal of funds abound.  Issuers often divert the proceeds sub-optimally away from the 
use designated in the prospectuses without the prior consent of shareholders (Shleifer, 1998; 
Liu et al., 2013). A fund of new, uncommitted resources is bound to be viewed with 
suspicion, and the issue is accordingly received unfavourably. 
     In contrast to open offers, private placements show a downward movement in price prior 
to the announcement in the interquartile range of –0.25% to –0.10%. Targeted investors are 
typically the controlling shareholders, and private placements are accordingly often 
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accompanied by price manipulation and insider trading with a view to transferring benefits 
from the public to targeted investors.  The management seek to acquire shares at a low price 
by timing the issue when the price is depressed in favour of the controlling shareholders as 
noted by Wu et al. (2010).  Such favoured investors can then later reap huge financial gains 
from dealings when the price rises.  This opportunism normally occurs immediately prior to 
or on the trading day itself (Wu et al., 2010).  In anticipations, the market reacts with a 
significant, negative response upon the announcement in the form of a 0.11% drop in market 
returns.   
     The market’s post–announcement reaction contrasts with the pre–issue case.  Most 
notably, the majority of any daily abnormal returns revert to the level quickly and remain 
positive following the announcement.  Firms that conduct private placements in China are 
usually underperforming firms including Special Transfer firms and Particular Transfer 
firms
3
 which struggle to maintain their level of operations.  Underperforming firms seek an 
injection of good assets by their controlling shareholders or strategic cash by institutional 
investors.  The favourable reaction following the announcement partly reflects relief as the 
market witnesses the replacement of bad assets with good assets and/or the introduction of 
strategic institutional investors.  The reaction can partly be seen as a response to the 
certification effect associated with institutional investment. These together serve to offset 
concerns about any propensity to post-issue overinvestment or related-party transactions.   
     Convertible bond issues experience a spell of positive daily returns in the interquartile 
range of 0.04% to 0.21% prior to the announcement. The issue announcement then 
precipitates a significant market price rise of some 18%.  The share price then remains at the 
new high level following the announcement in the interquartile range of –0.09% to 0.29%.  A 
convertible is an instrument of intrinsically good quality due to its contractual discipline.  
Conversion terms have the power to signal optimism about future increase in corporate value 
with the result that convertible issues can help to allay the doubts of a more conservative 
investor habitat. In addition, convertible issues in China are subject to strict regulatory 
criteria, guarantee requirements and scrutiny with the result that such issues are typically 
undertaken by financially sound firms.  All of these factors inspire strong market confidence. 
                                                 
3.  The CSRC introduced the delisting system in 1998 for firms that suffer financial or other abnormalities.  A firm is 
labelled as a special transfer (ST) if it sustains losses for two consecutive years and its shares are subject to 5% daily 
price limit movements. If an ST firm fails to become profitable in the third year, its shares are put under particular 
transfer (PT) and suspended from trading on the Main Board. The PT firm will be delisted if it fails to make a profit 
within six months of its suspension. 
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Insert Table 1 here. 
Further insights may be gained by examining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
over various event windows.  These are reported in Table 2.  There is a significant, positive 
CAR over the [–20, –1] window for open offers at the 1% level, whilst the CARs for rights 
issues and private placements are also significant but negative at the 5% level.  The CARs 
over various other windows in the post-announcement periods, namely [+1, +5], [+1, +10] 
and [+1, +20], are significant and negative for open offers mostly at the 5% level and 
especially for rights issues at the 5% level; whereas they are positive for private placements 
and convertible issues with different levels of significance.  The market responses over these 
events windows are consistent with the ARs presented in Table 1, altogether substantiating a 
distinctive market perception of risks and prospects pertaining to each form of issuance in 
China’s market.  
Further, the average five-day announcement period CAR over the [–2, +2] window is –
1.64% for rights issues and –0.36% for open offers at the 5% level.  Notably, private 
placements evince a positive five-day CAR of 0.08% at the 5% level, even though market 
returns present contrasting pre- and post-issuance patterns.  This suggests that private 
placements are generally regarded as a source of strategic investment, which carries the 
power to promote the prosperity of firms through the injection of good assets and needed 
cash.  The five-day CAR for convertible issues amounts to a significant 1.27%. 
     In summary, our observed differing reactions across the forms of issuance are only 
partially consistent with the empirical evidence for mature markets.  Notably, a U.S. rights 
issue does not trigger a negative price reaction (e.g., Martin-Ugedo, 2003) but we observe a 
significantly negative reaction in our case of China. A convertible issue induces a negative 
effect in the US and UK (e.g., Abhyankar and Dunning, 1999; Lewis and Verwijmeren, 
2011), while the opposite holds true for China. A private placement announcement conveys a 
positive signal in mature markets (e.g., Krishnamurthy et al., 2005; Akhigbe et al., 2006), but 
not in the case of our findings for Chinese issuers during the pre-announcement period. 
     At the same time, our results share common ground with the implications of the 
information asymmetric hypothesis and the agency cost hypothesis.  Managers attempt to 
exploit mispricing opportunities and investors tend to infer that the firm is overpriced when 
an open offering is announced, as per Myers and Majluf (1984).  The unfavourable market 
reactions to rights issues and private placements during the pre-announcement period suggest 
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that equity issuance is agency-driven.  This impact is mitigated when an issue is supported by 
protective provisions as in convertible issues or by the injection of strategic resources as in 
private placements during the post-announcement period – both being forces which combat 
agency.  Overall, the negative market reactions in plain equity issuance reflect the 
particularly powerful agency problems, which permeate China’s informationally opaque 
market subject as it is to the activities of powerful, personally self–interested and otherwise 
manipulative investors.  This state of affairs accords with our hypotheses, to the effect that 
the suspicion associated with equity can be allayed by the safeguards achievable through 
convertible bonds. At the same time, it remains unclear how far the negative average 
abnormal returns surrounding the time of the announcement in the case of open offers and 
rights issues are related to the information contained in a range of potential determinants.  
Likewise, we ask what best explains the contrasting market reaction in the case of convertible 
bond issues.  We further ask why market price behaves distinctively in private placements.  
The above observations and discussion substantiate the case for further exploration. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
(ii) Multiple Variable Analysis  
(1) Hypothesis Development 
Our empirical results presented above clearly suggest the existence of distinct market 
responses to the issue announcement.  In order to pursue the observed differences, we 
estimate multiple variable regression models to explore the relative contribution of three sets 
of variables to market returns for different forms of seasoned offerings.  The variables are 
designed to represent: characteristics of issuers to capture pre-issue inter-firm variability; 
characteristics of individual issues before and immediately after the announcement; and 
features specific to the individual type of security.  We use the five-day CAR: two days 
before the announcement date to two days after it [–2, +2], as the dependent variable.  Our 
variables are described below and formally set out in Table 3. 
Pre–issue features:    Research evidence suggests that the pre-issue features of issuing 
firms are crucial in determining the market’s perception of the value of the new issue 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Barnes and Walker, 2006). We accordingly consider the pre-
issue market-to-book ratio, earnings forecasts, price run-up, dividend payment, ownership 
and firm size preceding the issuance in the estimation. 
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     Market-book ratio (MBpre-issue).  Firms with growth prospects frequently have a high 
market-to-book ratio (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004).  High 
MB is commonly associated with dynamism and promise;  hence the risk (Fama and French, 
1992). In the case of China, there is complementary evidence that a high MB is associated 
with growth as well as the risk of failure (Chen et al., 2007).  An equity issue can fuel latent 
growth and the market’s appraisal of a financing event will reflect this insofar as it is 
perceptible and credible. Whilst following the broad consensus concerning MB, we recognise 
that in a market with limited transparency and a measure of corruption, we must be on the 
alert when examining our results for any signs that a high MB may be influenced by 
potentially unfavourable factors such as the existence of overvalued growth itself, intangible 
assets prone to overvaluation, the low quality of tangible assets and the impact of accounting 
conventions including historic cost (Pagano and Roell, 1998), or market anomalies associated 
with cognitive biases and agency costs on the part of investors (Lakonishok et al., 1994).  We 
measure the pre-issue growth prospects of the firm using MB, which is defined as the sum of 
assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity, divided by assets, as at 
the balance sheet date immediately prior to the issue announcement. 
     Analysts' forecasts (FCASTDiverg).  The counsel of share analysts may appear at first sight 
to be a means of making abnormal gains.  The market believes that reputable analysts supply 
more accurate earnings forecasts than other analysts. Hence, they are able to contribute to 
market efficiency by reducing asymmetric information among market participants, which 
militates against mispricing (Bowen et al., 2008).  At the same time, the agency cost 
hypothesis attributes a favourable bias to analysts derived from conflict of interests.  Biased 
reports may arise from analysts' reliance on lines of communication with corporate 
executives and/or from pressure to favour client companies. From fear of jeopardizing 
business relationships, analysts may be reluctant to make unfavourable recommendations to 
current or potential client companies (Francis and Philbrick, 1993; Feng and McVay, 2010).  
Such unwillingness appears to apply to China.  Analysts in brokerage firms are under intense 
pressure to gain investment banking business and managers put pressure on brokers to refrain 
from making unfavourable recommendations (Ang and Ma, 1999). This causes investors to 
mistrust earnings forecasts published in issue prospectuses.  The resulting hypothesis is that 
earnings forecasts are positively, but weakly, correlated with abnormal returns, regardless of 
the form of issuance.  To test market sensitivity to analysts’ forecasts, we use the divergence 
of analysts’ forecasts, FCASTDiverg, measured as the difference between the actual and the 
forecasted earnings for the year when the new issue is undertaken.   
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     Price run-up (RUNUP). The timing hypothesis proposes that the management are 
systematically trying to create a wealth transfer from new shareholders to existing 
shareholders (Alti, 2006).  When the firm becomes over-valued, the management recapitalise 
the firm through an equity issue.  The manipulation of price in the run up to an offering is 
eminently feasible in an environment where accounting and auditing standards are flawed 
(Teoh et al., 1998; Shivakumar, 2000; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010).  In response, the stock 
market reacts negatively to the issue announcement, which tends to be followed by periods of 
negative returns.  Hypothesising that the reaction depends on both the implications for cash 
flows and the degree of surprise, we examine market timing across the four types of issue 
using RUNUP, which is measured as the market-adjusted abnormal returns over the 180-day 
window (event days –181 to –1)  using the value-weighted market index as a benchmark.  
     Dividend payment (DIV).  The role of dividends as a driver of shareholder value has been 
subject to controversy over recent decades. Lintner (1956) and Gordon (1959) formalise the 
popular, traditional position that dividends are a favourable signal which, judiciously 
managed, can improve firm value.  Miller and Modigliani (1961) challenge this traditional 
position on the basis of their exposition of the ideal markets case.  Opponents hold that 
dividends have a negative impact on shareholder value since firms with high dividend 
payouts have higher required rates of return and hence lower share prices, or are 
economically insignificant (Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979; Ang and Peterson, 1985). 
Denis and Osobov (2008) provide a cross-country analysis to this effect. Others provide 
evidence to indicate that dividends are highly relevant to share price but in different 
directions at different times (Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Pinkowitz et al., 2006).   
     While the impact of distribution policy on share price remains inconclusive, dividends 
may serve as one of the few available credible signal of financial mobility where market 
efficiency is limited.  However, this may be due to the fact that in China low cash dividend 
payments are very common among listed firms. Those firms that adopt a constant cash 
dividend policy only account for 5.5% (Allen et al., 2005). It is commonly observed that 
many of them pay stable dividends prior to an issue, but soon reduce or even suspend 
dividend payments once the new shares are floated (Fernald and Rogers, 2002).  To curb this 
malpractice, in 2006 the CSRC promulgated the “Management of Cash Dividends by Listed 
Companies” with a view to improving the quality of the distribution system and safeguarding 
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shareholders’ interests.4  Despite such efforts on the regulator’s part, a dividend may amount 
to a cash-wasting attempt falsely to signal a promise or as a means of shedding uninvestable 
cash in a time of decline.  Given the inconclusiveness of the debate concerning dividends and 
special complications in the case of China, it appears to be appropriate to acquiesce in the 
inconclusiveness of the debate rather than hypothesise in one direction. To capture the 
potential impact of the distinctive, albeit irregular, prior-issue payment decision, as opposed 
to the post-issue dividend payment decision, while taking due account of the regulatory 
requirements, we define dividend payments using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if a firm paid a dividend in the two years prior to the issue, or 0 otherwise.  
     Ownership concentration (Herf3).   Significant changes in ownership structure associated 
with the new issue can  materially affect the value of both the existing and the new investors’ 
stakes in the firm (Kothare, 1997).  The liquidity hypothesis suggests that large block 
holdings can increase the liquidity of their stakes if blockholders subscribe for rights and gain 
a significant portion of new shares (Armitage, 2010).  The corporate control hypothesis 
proposes that blockholders possess greater resources than individual investors and can 
become better informed. They often command dominant voting power, feel more committed 
to the firm, and, hence, have a greater incentive to monitor the issuer (Gul et al., 2010). Such 
a control structure will militate against the incentive to invest issue proceeds in projects 
which serve private interests at the expense of the corporate interest.  Against this, agency 
theory argues that ownership concentration aggravates conflicts notably between minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholders with voting power.  These conflicts and potential 
abuses operate against a fair market valuation (Slovin et al., 2000). 
     Corporate ownership in China is highly concentrated in the hands of a single investor or a 
group of investors – usually the state itself and state-owned enterprises or institutions holding 
over 60 percent of the voting shares of firms.   This highly concentrated ownership structure 
has led to entrenchment, encroachment, and appropriation on the part of dominant 
shareholders to the detriment of minority shareholders, and firm value is severely 
underestimated.  This is all the more serious because the legal protection of external investors 
is weak.  It is commonly observed that the dominant controllers have a strong incentive and 
                                                 
4.  The CSRC imposed the “Management of Cash Dividends by Listed Companies” in 2006, which stipulates that issuers 
must continue with dividend payments in the two years following the new issue. 
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opportunity to seize large amounts of cash at their disposal to engage in self-serving 
expropriation, mostly by means of related-party transactions (Liu et al., 2013).  Decisions on 
seasoned issues cannot therefore be dissociated from the pursuit of private benefits by 
controllers who show scant regard for minority shareholders.  Few public shareholders have 
participated in discussing issue plans at the available opportunities to exercise any influence 
on the issue decision.  The opportunistic and vigilant pursuit of self-interest on the part of the 
most powerful and influential shareholders will operate unfavourably.  The foregoing 
discussion leads to our hypothesis that ownership concentration has a negative price effect 
when a new issue is announced with the strength of the effect depending on the extent of 
investors’ concern.  To test for the significance and direction of the influence of ownership 
concentration on market returns, we employ the Herfindahl index to measure ownership 
concentration by way of the largest three shareholders’ shareholdings within the firm, Herf3, 
as at the balance sheet date immediately prior to the issue announcement. 
     Size of firm (SIZE).  Stocks of small-capitalisation companies tend to be more volatile than 
those of large-capitalisation companies (Jain and Kini, 1999).  In China, a growing tension 
exists between the continued pressure to expand the stock market and the lack of new capital.  
Amid asymmetric information about the small-cap stocks and excessive speculation in the 
secondary market, investors scramble to buy small-cap stocks at a high price even where their 
performance and prospects are distinctly lacklustre, with a view to stagging them for short-
term gains. Trading in the stocks of large-cap companies is less vulnerable to market 
fluctuations and subject to more efficient pricing because their performance tends to be more 
stable and is closely monitored by large, active, sophisticated and credible market 
participants. However, an unfavourable influence arises when the government’s typical 
retention of direct control over many large firms through majority shareholdings encourages 
managerial entrenchments and corporate tunnelling. Such a prospect might well be expected 
to trigger a negative market reaction. Small firms, by contrast, tend to be shielded from 
government ownership, leaving them free to develop their growth potential (Liu and Pang, 
2009).  In such circumstances, their managers’ interests are more likely to be aligned with 
those of shareholders.  We accordingly hypothesise that market returns are negatively 
associated with firm size. We measure firm size by the natural logarithm of the firm’s market 
capitalisation prior to the issue, adjusted by the inflation rate in the corresponding year. 
Issue characteristics: By way of potentially significant issue characteristics, we consider 
underwriting, auditing, discount in subscription price, offering size, intended use of issue 
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proceeds, and change in capital structure following the issuance in the estimation. 
     Discount in subscription price (DISC).  The market efficiency hypothesis suggests that the 
subscription price should be directly related to the disparity between the management’s 
assessment of the firm’s quality and the market’s valuation of the firm (Eckbo and Masulis, 
1992; Armitage, 2010).  In an issue where the underwriter expects a lower take-up from 
existing shareholders, underwriters must incur higher investigation costs and hence impose a 
higher issue price discount to protect them from the failure of the offer.  As an alternative to 
underwriting, the issuer can reduce the risk of a failed issue equally effectively by setting a 
sufficiently low offer price relative to the current uninformed market price (Marsh, 1980; 
Slovin et al., 2000). In the presence of information asymmetries, a deep discount issue serves 
as a substitute mechanism for ensuring a full subscription to the offer (Bohren et al., 1997). 
     Under the CSRC listing rules, the subscription price must be linked to the firm’s market 
price.  To prevent deep discounting and protect shareholders’ interests, the CSRC stipulates 
that the issue price shall not be either below or above the average price for 20 trading days 
prior to a benchmarking date in the cases of open offers, private placements and convertible 
issues, while no benchmarking date is set for rights issues.  In line with the CSRC’s 
benchmarking dates for pricing, the announcement day for rights issues is deemed to be the 
first publication of the firm’s intention to undertake a rights issue.  The announcement day for 
open offers is deemed to be the first publication of the firm’s intention to undertake an open 
offer. The press release date of the decisive board meeting is taken to be the announcement 
day for private placements. The date of the announcement of the issue prospectus is taken as 
the announcement day for convertible issues.  Hence, we define the discount in subscription 
price, DISC, as follows: 
**
20, /)( PPPDISC tsub                             (3) 
where 20, tsubP  is the average closing price for the 20 trading days prior to the issue 
announcement date; and 
*P  is the subscription price for new shares for each individual issue.  
A larger, positive DISC indicates a higher discount, while a negative number indicates 
premiums.  If the market discount is a reflection of the quality of the issuers, then the market 
should respond favourably insofar as the issuer is deemed to be a good-quality issuer, whilst 
the opposite holds for a poor-quality issuer.  Further, if the market interprets rights issues as a 
special offer to state owners, then a relatively lower subscription price in relation to the 
current market price will be viewed unfavourably and interpreted as a value loss connected 
with relation-building and opportunistic undertakings on the part of state owners and other 
24 
 
inside parties. It is, accordingly, reasonable to formulate our hypotheses for the three cases in 
accordance with the above discussion.    
     In respect of private placements, the discount effect may differ according to the targeted 
investors. To explore this possibility, we distinguish price discount in the case of controlling 
shareholders from that of institutional investors. We hypothesise that there is a significant, 
adverse impact on market returns if target investors are controlling shareholders in 
accordance with agency considerations, but a significant, positive impact if target investors 
are institutional investors in accordance with a certification effect.  To test the significance 
and direction of the distinctive impacts, we include the interaction terms between price 
discount and the target investor, namely DISCBUYERController and DISC BUYERInstitution, 
in the estimation. 
     Underwriting (UNDER). The signalling model points to the relevance of underwriting to 
firm attributes. The highest quality firms are expected to prefer an uninsured offer, medium 
quality firms an underwritten offer and the lowest quality firms a full commitment offer 
(Heinkel and Schwartz, 1986). The adverse selection hypothesis suggests that undervalued 
firms will tend to experience higher participation rates and the selection of uninsured issues, 
leading to a positive price reaction.  Low quality firms with an anticipated low participation 
rate opt for a full commitment contract, thus triggering a negative price reaction (Eckbo and 
Masulis,  1992).  An opposing view holds that the highest quality firms would choose an 
insured issue because underwriter certification provides them with a quality seal (Gopalan et 
al., 2011).  
     In China, all new issues, apart from private placements, must be underwritten in line with 
the CSRC regulations. In the case of rights issues, the CSRC requires that an issue be 
underwritten by the best efforts procedure for the sake of quality assurance and in the 
interests of state ownership.  The procedure is mandatory which may reduce the quality 
assurance effect associated with auditing. We accordingly expect a small or zero effect for 
underwriting.  Underwriting decisions on open offers, convertible issues and in particular 
private placements are at management’s discretion. Assuming that the market is aware of the 
implications of this situation and the costs of the range of options, our corresponding 
hypothesis is that there is a positive relationship between underwriting and market returns, 
but that the strength of the effect depends on the risk associated with the chosen method. In 
descending order of the risk to which the underwriter is exposed, the methods are full 
commitment, best efforts and standby.  We employ three dummy coded variables, UnderFull, 
UnderBest, and UnderStandby, for the three methods. UnderFull takes the value of 1 where an 

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issue is underwritten in full, or 0 otherwise. UnderBest takes the value of 1 where an issue is 
underwritten by best efforts, or 0 otherwise. UnderStandby takes the value of 1 where an issue is 
underwritten by standby, or 0 otherwise.  
      Auditing (AUDIT).  The quality of auditing plays an external monitoring role on behalf of 
shareholders in attesting to the credibility of accounting information produced by 
management (Cohen et al., 2002).  High-quality auditors help to improve the firm’s corporate 
governance and restrain agency problems (Hay and Davis, 2004), whilst low-quality auditors 
cannot effectively exercise the monitoring of clients’ financial reporting processes (Claessens 
et al., 2002)  and may be susceptible to coercion.  It is tempting to conclude that a new issue 
that is audited by a notably more prestigious firm sends a favourable signal to the market.  
However in an emerging, uncertain market with limited transparency, the contrary possibility 
must be recognised and tested not least because sub-contracting to local firms may threaten 
even a top firm’s credibility. In China, all listed firms are required by the CSRC to have their 
new issues audited by Certified Public Accountants (CPAs).
5
 An auditor’s commercial 
relationship with its client may cause it to be unduly accommodating and - either locally or 
worldwide - there may arise a conflict of interest between the audit and consultancy roles.  
There have been several cases in China recently where the credibility of audited figures has 
been challenged, for example, NQ Mobile. Regulators are tightening the rules on short sales 
in order to contain abuses. There is clearly a greater danger with regard to rights issues, open 
offers and private placements that do not share the contractual disciplines of convertible bond 
issues. Accounting standards remain low in practice even though international standards 
nominally apply, and irregularities are widespread. Analysts are also misled in extreme ways 
such as hiring employees and renting inventories in advance of their inspections.  It follows 
that auditing can lead to outcomes which enhance firm value when a top firm conducts a full 
audit without subcontracting, or to outcomes that detract from corporate value when the 
auditor is deemed unreliable, or indeed to neither when the market sets no store by the audit 
function. We, accordingly, hypothesise that an issue benefits from the presence of a top-10 
auditor. We define a dummy variable, AUDIT, that takes the value of 1 for Top-10 auditors, 
or 0 for auditors who are not within the Top-10 category.
6
 
                                                 
5.  CPAs were originally set up and sponsored by the local governments and institutions in the early 1990s, and have been 
gradually transformed into independent auditors through a series of reforms. CPAs claim to have now adopted 
international accounting and auditing standards and to function accordingly. 
6.  The Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) has ranked the Top 100 Chinese audit firms since 2002 
based on their annual revenues as publicised by CICPA.  As the Top–10 ranking is relatively stable, we extend the 
ranking to 1998 in order to maintain our sample size. 
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     Size of offering (OFFER). The price pressure hypothesis suggests that the market reacts 
negatively to an increase in the supply of shares because an increased supply of shares tends 
to force the share price to drop (Asquith and Mullins Jr., 1986).  According to agency theory, 
issue proceeds are vulnerable to sub-optimal investment deployment as management exercise 
discretion regarding their personal interests even to the extent of threatening corporate 
survival.  Furthermore, raised funds may be withdrawn into associated companies in which 
managers have more substantial interests, to the detriment of the deprived firm (Bates et al., 
2009; Mann and Sicherman, 1991).   
     At the same time, larger issues stand to benefit from more vigilant monitoring, and inspire 
greater market confidence accordingly (Lamberto and Rath, 2006).   In this regard, existing 
research shows a positive association between large issues and large issuers and between 
large projects and high prospective investment opportunities in both the private and public 
domains (Jain and Kini, 1999; Tan et al., 2002).  This argument, however, may not hold for 
China where a larger issue is most likely to be beset with substantial agency costs.  
Management appropriate cash from the market and direct it into low-yielding investments 
and tunnelling operations; they even alter the usage of proceeds from that specified in the 
prospectus, deploying proceeds non-productively, altogether impairing long-term firm value 
(Liu et al., 2013).  We, accordingly, hypothesise that open offers, rights issues and private 
placements are particularly prone to agency problems due to the ex post utilisation of issue 
proceeds, leading to a negative market reaction. 
     Convertible bonds are subject to strict discipline, which mitigates agency dangers (Stein, 
1992; Jiraporn and Gleason, 2007).  Further, in China, firms proposing to issue convertible 
bonds are required by the CSRC to have these rated and reviewed annually in order to 
account for any outlook changes.  The market anticipates effort and disciplined behaviour.  In 
addition, funds raised through convertible issues are often linked with national strategic 
projects. This is likely to extend the scrutiny of the firm. We therefore hypothesise that a 
convertible issue is positively associated with market returns. We define the size of the 
offering according to the type of issuance, OfferRI, OfferOO, OfferPP and OfferCV, which are 
measured, respectively, as the ratio of gross proceeds raised through rights issues, open 
offers, private placements and convertible issues over the firm’s market capitalisation at the 
accounting year end preceding the issue. 
     Intended use of issue proceeds (FUSE). The asymmetric information hypothesis addresses 
new financing events but does not distinguish between the different purposes for which funds 
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will be deployed (Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). Walker and Yost (2008) document that the 
market reaction depends on the intended use of  issue proceeds.  The CSRC requires that 
issuers publish a detailed statement specifying how acquired proceeds are to be deployed 
across four broad categories. The Wind Financial Terminal provides detailed information for 
individual projects and their corresponding investment amount. We examine all reports for 
the 1,810 issues published in the China Securities Times for the period 1992–2010 and 
ascertain that all issuers specify the intended use.  Most issuers stipulate multiple usage.  In 
such cases, we adopt the primary stated application as measured by the largest investment 
amount.  We then allocate each case across four categories, namely, innovation and high–tech 
projects, general fixed investment including the acquisition of other companies, intra-firm 
investment, and the repayment of debt or financing working capital.  
     Our hypotheses follow accordingly. As high-tech projects enhance the firm’s 
competiveness and prospects, and the general fixed investment increases the real asset base of 
the firm, we hypothesise that both impinge positively on market returns.  By contrast, intra-
firm investment carries high potential agency costs primarily associated with related-party 
transactions, and hence embodies a negative potential.  The repayment of debt or financing 
working capital needs does not necessarily change the asset structure of the firm, yet such 
repayment may be harmful to the extent that a lower financial leverage reduces the value of 
any effective corporate tax shield and that financing additional working capital needs are 
equated by the market with a less disciplined use of resources by management seeking to 
shirk their accountabilities. Hence, we hypothesise that there is a negative relationship 
between the repayment of debt and financing working capital needs and market returns. We 
employ four dummy coded variables, FUSETech, FUSEFixed, FUSEIntra, and FUSEDWC, for the 
four intended usage of issue proceeds. FUSETech takes the value of 1 for innovation and high-
tech projects, or 0 otherwise. FUSEFixed takes the value of 1 for general fixed investment, or 0 
otherwise.  FUSEIntra takes the value of 1 for intra-firm investment, or 0 otherwise.  FUSEDWC 
takes the value of 1 for the repayment of debt or financing working capital needs, or 0 
otherwise.  
     Change in capital structure (ΔDE): The extent of the vulnerability of equity to agency 
costs depends on the overall capital structure, in the sense that a levered capital structure 
incorporates disciplines which offset equity’s agency costs. Judicious financial leverage helps 
to ensure that operations are conducted in such a way that they will meet contractual 
obligations (Myers and Majluf, 1984). An increase in equity is potentially detrimental to 
existing shareholders to the extent that it reduces the risk of the firm's outstanding debt 
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without necessarily adding to the value of equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  This applies 
even more to the case of China, where the decision to issue equity brings into play the 
prevalent, widespread agency issues which beset the market.  The market duly responds 
unfavourably in the form of negative market returns.  We accordingly hypothesise that a 
negative relationship exists between the ΔDE ratio and abnormal market returns surrounding 
the announcement of the issuance.  We measure the change in capital structure by introducing 
the offering size into Equation (4) in order to relate the change in capital structure caused by 
the amount issued to the overall financial resources invested in the firm. 
MV
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where Debt is the total book value of short term and long term debt; Equity is the gross 
proceeds raised in the new issue; MV is the market value of the firm on day t = –30; and α is 
the proportion of funds proposed by the issuing firm for refinancing existing debt. The 
market value of the issuing firm is the product of the share's closing price on day t = –30 and 
the total number of outstanding shares prior to the issue (Tan et al., 2002). 
     Security-specific characteristics: Features specific to the security issue itself 
potentially influence the market’s perception about the value of a new issue and can be 
identified in the case of rights issues, private placements and convertible issues.  We account 
in the estimations for take-up in rights issues, targeted buyer in private placements, and credit 
rating in convertible issues.   
      Rights take-up (TAKEUP): The liquidity hypothesis suggests that large block holdings 
narrow the investor base of the firm, causing a liquidity reduction in the firm’s shares which, 
in turn, adds to the price pressure on the shares issued.  However, if they “guarantee” a buy-
up of a big portion of new shares, large block holdings may lead to increased firm liquidity 
(Kothare, 1997) and reduced ownership dilution or wealth transfer from old to new 
shareholders through the lessening of asymmetric information (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992).   
     In China, the largest shareholders fail to take up their rights on a pro-rata basis, but this 
does not threaten their controlling status as they hold an ultimately dominant position in the 
firm by way of a stake exceeding 60 percent.  The management exploit the opportunity to 
grab money from the market as soon as the firm meets the issue criteria, regardless of 
whether they have enough cash to subscribe for the rights. Conflicts of interest between the 
largest shareholders and the uninformed minority shareholders loom large.  This would be 
expected to drive down the share price when the announcement is made.  If the largest 
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shareholders take up the rights, the market should respond positively insofar as a lower risk 
of agency costs will be perceived. This is particularly significant in China’s prevailing 
scenario of conflicting interest, minority exploitation and informational opacity. We 
accordingly hypothesise that there is a positive relationship between take-up and market 
returns.  We define a dummy variable, TAKEUP, that takes the value of 1 if the largest 
shareholders take up the rights, or 0 otherwise. 
     Target buyers in private placements (BUYER): In private placements, the shares are 
offered to selected investors, which are often institutions that may pass them on to the public. 
Typically targeted at institutional investors, private placements benefit from the certification 
effect associated with the standing of the chosen investors (Wruck, 1989; Chakraborty and 
Gantchev, 2013). Although the placing price must contain some inducement to subscribe, the 
undervaluation problems associated with the negative signals of open offerings are avoided 
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Wang, 2012).  An offsetting unfavourable impact may, however, 
arise when a pyramid ownership structure and intra-group cross-holdings produce strong 
incentives for the controlling shareholders to indulge in – as often in China – related-party 
transactions and overinvestment (Shleifer, 2000). When targeted subscribers include the 
controlling shareholders as applies in China, there is an incentive for management to issue 
shares when they are known to be undervalued in the market. When outside institutional 
investors are being sought, there is a contrary incentive to issue shares when prices are known 
to be high (Wu et al., 2010).  Our corresponding hypothesis is that the market reacts 
negatively if the acquirer of shares is the controlling shareholder but positively if the acquirer 
is an institution. We define a dummy variable, BUYER, that takes the value of 1 if the shares 
are sold to the controlling shareholders, or 0 if they are sold to institutional investors. 
     Rating of convertible issues (RATE):   The asymmetric information hypothesis predicts 
that the price reaction to security offerings depends on the sensitivity of firm value to the 
change in the value of the new securities (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  Credit ratings 
potentially affect share price by adding to public information about the creditworthiness of 
issuers.  In China, the CSRC requires that convertible bond issuers have their convertibles 
rated and arrange follow-up ratings.  All qualified issues must be rated preferably AA+ and 
above, but no lower than A–.  In addition, the criteria are set high in terms of profitability, 
capital adequacy and guarantees.  It follows that the usual benefit of rating in a competitive 
market is reduced owing to the fact that the ratings in China tend to be uniformly high as a 
result of this quality hurdle (Poon and Chan, 2008).  Our corresponding hypothesis is that a 
weak, positive relationship or no relationship exists between credit ratings and market 
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returns.  To test the signalling power of rating as discussed by Myers and Majluf (1984), we 
include credit ratings and define a dummy variable, RATE, which takes the value of 1 if the 
convertible is assigned AA+ and above, or 0 if it is below AA+ but above A–.  
Insert Table 3 here. 
(2) Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 reports the basic characteristics of variables, comparing the idiosyncratic 
characteristics of both the issuers and the issues across the four types of seasoned issuance.  
Prior to issuance, it appears that OO-firms have a higher median MB ratio (1.76) compared to 
RI-firms (1.62) and PP-firms (1.55), while CV-firms evince the lowest level of growth 
opportunities (1.41).  With respect to analysts’ forecasts, it appears that analysts are more 
reserved in the case of rights issues (–0.003%) and private placements (–0.005%), with 
greater divergence regarding cash offers (0.017%), which reflects their perception of the 
issuer’s prospects and underlying risk–taking in their future operations.7  The run-up in price 
is highest for open offers (0.29), corresponding to the most significant increase in market 
returns prior to the announcement as shown in Table 2, but lowest for private placements at -
0.03.  Furthermore, the majority of issuers – particularly in the case of private placements – 
pay dividends in the two years preceding the proposed issue, which is in line with the CSRC 
requirements.  Firms that conduct rights issues, open offers and private placements have a 
relatively lower ownership concentration (20%, 15%, and 18%, respectively), compared to 
CV-firms whose ownership is highly concentrated (34%). Overall, this degree of 
concentration shows that the largest shareholders have absolute control within Chinese firms.  
RI-firms are the smallest in terms of firm size (17.60), while convertible issuers are the 
largest (20.99).  This supports the claim that convertible issues are the natural preserve of 
large firms.
8
 
    With regards to issue-specifics surrounding the issue announcement period, rights issues 
tend to be made at a far deeper discount (0.66), compared to open offers (0.12).  In China, the 
                                                 
7.  Using analysts’ forecasts for earnings per share, we find that CV-firms present the most prosperous earnings forecasts 
measured by the difference of forecasted and actual earnings per share (12.84%), while the reverse holds for OO-firms 
(9.02%).  In terms of issue guarantees and contractual safeguards, the issue criteria are the strictest in convertible bond 
issues, helping to restrict issues to sound, well performing firms.  In private placements, the criteria are the least strict, 
thus making them more attractive to worse-performing issuers. 
8. According to the Interim Measures for the Administration of Issuance of Convertible Bonds by Listed Companies, which 
was promulgated in 1997 and revised in 2001 and 2006, a company needs to meet the following requirements in order to 
qualify for a convertible bond issue: 1) the minimum issue amount should not be less than 100 million yuan; 2) net assets 
should not be less than 2.5 billion yuan; and 3) the company must have been continuously profitable and the weighted 
averaged ROE should not be less than 10 percent in the last three accounting years. 
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largest shareholders commonly renounce their rights.  This arouses serious concerns among 
investors regarding potential abuses of the proceeds of the issue, who often react by failing to 
subscribe.  Underwriters set a deep discount in anticipation of a lower take-up to protect 
themselves from potential failure. Notably among these statistics, the discount for private 
placements is far smaller, at 0.097 – just below 0.10, the benchmark for discount price in 
private placements set out by the CSRC. This is evidence to suggest that PP-firms cultivate 
the price in order to comply with the CSRC benchmark.  By contrast, convertible bonds (–
0.03) are sold at a premium.  Convertible issues are implemented by the largest firms with a 
strong financial standing, good ratings and credible guarantees, and are backed by strict 
regulations. The underwriter accordingly expects to experience the least risk owing to the full 
subscription by a confident market. 
    All rights issues are underwritten by best efforts, which is in accordance with the CSRC 
listing rules; whereas, 49.47% of open offers are underwritten in this way.  In the case of 
private placements, it is only 0.66%. In addition, 100%, 27.63% and 19.57% of the issues are 
underwritten by the standby method in convertible issues, private placements and open offers, 
respectively.  Full commitments are mostly used in open offers (22.78%) where the danger of 
a failed issue looms largest. This compares with 3.29% for a private placement and none for 
convertible issues.  In the case of issues which are not underwritten, the majority of private 
placements (68.42%) are privately arranged between the issuers and the buyers, but only 
8.19% for open offers and none for rights issues. 
     In terms of auditing quality, more than half of the issuers are not audited by the ‘Top-10’, 
except with regard to open offers. This practice may reflect the old adage that ‘bad auditors 
drive out good’ with resultant damage to public confidence in the case of rights issues and 
private placements; whereas, with high quality issuance such as in convertible bonds, where 
implicit safeguards exist, the issuer sets out to minimise issue costs as in mature markets. The 
predilection for the Top-10 in the case of open offers (56%) could be explained by the 
particularly exigent need for issuers to garner every possible resource of credibility in order 
to convince the market.  
     With respect to the size of the offering, rights issues are the smallest because their size is 
contained by the 30% cap imposed by the CSRC.  The largest issues are convertible issues 
(0.68), followed by private placements (0.59) and open offers (0.47). These observations are 
consistent with Table A1 showing that private placements have overtaken open offers and 
become the dominant means of equity issuance since 2005 when the full scale of the split-
share structure reform was launched. The shift reflects the demand for capital or asset 
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injection for corporate restructuring, which accords with the intention of this reform. 
     As far as the intended use of issue proceeds is concerned, the most frequently professed 
destination is general capital investment, directed at increasing the firm’s real asset base.  
This applies to all types of issue except for private placements, and is highest for rights issues 
(47.58%). Inter-firm allocation is the most frequently stated application in private placements 
(32.53%). Since private placements are intended to effect inter-firm allocation by means of 
an injection of fresh cash or assets by the parent, they may inevitably lead to a risk of related-
party transactions and agency-driven intra-firm transfers.  The repayment of debt and 
refinancing working capital is the highest in open offers (13.79%).  Compared to other 
groups, more private-placement firms say that they intend to use the proceeds for research 
and innovation (26.51%).  
     OO-firms experience a greater amount of change in their debt-equity ratio (19.26%) than 
other issuers.  RI-firms have the lowest level of ΔDE ratio (10.58%), arguably because the 
smaller issues required by the CSRC restriction limits their impact on the financial structure 
of the issuers. 
     With respect to issuance-specific features, in the case of rights issues, 90.76% of the 
largest shareholders do not take up their subscription rights or do not fully subscribe to their 
rights, confirming the wide claim that they, normally the state controllers, renounce their 
rights.  In the case of private placements, 59.59% of targeted investors are controlling 
shareholders, while 40.41% are institutional investors, a practice which differs from the 
situation in more mature markets.  In the case of convertible issues, more than half of the 
issuers (56.79%) are assigned AA+ and above, but none is below A– as required by CSRC 
listing rules. This is evidence to suggest that credit ratings are uniformly high among 
convertible issuers who have striven to conform to the CSRC issuance rules. 
     In sum, our initial results indicate potentially significant, distinctive behaviour on the part 
of issuers across the different forms of seasoned issuance.  We indicate in the presentation of 
our hypotheses how this relates both to the context of finance – notably agency theory – and 
to the evolving salient aspects of modern China’s mixed economy.  These distinctions and 
their underpinnings promise testable insights into finance theory and thereby justify the 
further analysis that we propose to undertake. 
Insert Table 4 around here. 
(3) Multiple Regression Results and Discussions 
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Table 5 presents the estimation results for rights issues, open offers, private placements and 
convertible bond issues based on ordinary least squares regressions of abnormal returns over 
the five–day announcement period [–2, +2] on variables that may play a role in determining 
price effects. 
     It appears that the pre-issue measures provide the market with certain insights into the 
quality of the corporate plan to which investors will be committed.  The results for the MB 
variable evince instructively contrasting results for the different forms of issues.  The 
regression coefficient on the MB ratio is highly significant and positive in the case of open 
offers (0.27, p<0.01), but negative in the case of rights issues and private placements (–0.30, 
–0.23, two Ps<0.05).  It is weakly associated with convertible issues at the 10% level.   
Combined with the results of the CAR analysis, the positive significance of MB in open 
offers does not seem to suggest that either the market or management set store by corporate 
growth prospects with higher MB presaging greater growth prospects.  Rather our findings 
suggest that MB reflects a measure of overvaluation particularly given the relative opacity of 
China’s market.  This overvaluation could partly be the result of over-exuberance and a lack 
of discrimination on the part of investors, both of which are clearly visible in the form of 
indiscriminate high volume of applications whenever a new issue occurs.  The adverse impact 
in the case of rights issues and private placements, which are prone to agency problems 
owing to the predominance of state ownership associated with the issuers, could well reflect 
the reality that issuers – often the state – take the opportunity to issue at a beneficial price to 
favoured parties, and the market fears that new investments will not reinforce prospects  but 
will rather encourage controlling shareholders to engage in related–party transactions and 
overinvestment.  Overall, our results suggest that the MB ratio is not perceived as a credible 
signal of prospects of future investment, rather than a measure of overvaluation and 
mispricing or a measure of market anomaly associated with agency costs on the part of inside 
parties.  However, we should be cautious about this interpretation as intrinsic equity values 
are less reliable in China than in more market–efficient environments. 
     The coefficient on FCASTdiverg has the expected sign with different degrees of 
significance.  There is most significance in the case of convertible bonds (0.19, p<0.05) but 
marginal significance for the other forms of issues.  The relatively weak correlation suggests 
that the market has limited confidence in analysts’ earnings forecasts in the case of plain 
equity offerings in contrast to convertible offerings.  In China, as convertible bonds are 
subject to more rigorous CSRC regulation, they lend themselves to more extensive analysis 
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than the other more opaque methods of equity issuance. This rigour increases the 
transparency and overall credibility of a convertible offering, leading to favourable market 
price behaviour.  
     Our findings in respect of price run-up provide informative differences across the types of 
issuance. We find a highly significant, positive effect in open offers (0.37, p<0.01) 
confirming our hypothesis that the price in the periods leading up to the issue comprises 
evidence that issuers go to market when shares are high or overpriced.  This result is 
consistent with the observations in the CAR analysis as reported in Tables 1 and 2.  Our 
finding supports the position that timing can be most readily achieved as suggested by Alti 
(2006), and is, in practice, being effected through equity issuance in the form of open offers.  
Price run-up is, likewise, highly significant and positive for convertible issues (0.22, p<0.01), 
but the circumstances of convertible issuance invite a different interpretation.  In this case, 
price run-up may reflect the market’s confident expectations about the quality of convertible 
issues due to their greater transparency and disciplinary obligations.  Rights issues and 
placements differ from the foregoing as well as from each other. Price run-up has a negative 
impact in the case of rights issues (–0.28, p<0.01), but a positive impact on private 
placements (0.27, p<0.10). For rights issues, the direct extraction of wealth dominates the 
influence of price run–up. More than 90% of the largest shareholders fail to take up their 
subscription rights or do not fully subscribe to their subscription rights as shown in Table 4.  
Investors regard rights issues as an opportunity on the part of the dominant shareholders to 
gather cash from the market when the price rises and to deploy it dysfunctionally and 
selfishly even to the extent, for example, of siphoning funds into associated companies where 
their proportionate interest exceeds that in the issuing company.  Our results lend support to 
Shivakumar’s (2000) and Cohen and Zarowin’s (2010) arguments that managers exploit 
mispricing opportunities in an environment where accounting and auditing standards are 
flawed.  In the case of private placements, agency influences and the dominance of the 
controlling shareholders prevail.  The management cut the costs of purchasing new shares by 
timing the issue when the price level is low rather than high. Such price manipulation can 
transfer benefits from the public to the target investors.  If and when in due course the price 
recovers, the market is reassured that controllers are discouraged from taking advantage of 
the low price. Overall, our findings across the four types of issue are consonant with the 
patterns of ARs and CARs observed for both the pre- and post-announcement periods as 
displayed in Tables 1 and 2. 
     There is no evidence to suggest that market returns are associated with any pattern of pre-
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issue dividend payments in the case of rights issues and convertible issues.  Further, they are 
weakly associated in the case of open offers. Our results fail to support the majority of 
previous studies that examine the roles of dividends in firm value (Baker and Wurgler, 2004; 
Pinkowitz et al., 2006), but are evidence to the effect that the market does not believe that 
pre-issue dividends presage future dividend levels in these issues.  According to our data, 
more than 50 percent of these issuing firms cut down or stop dividend payments shortly after 
the new issue has been completed (not shown).
9
  By comparison, dividend payments appear 
to impinge positively on private placements (0.26, p<0.05), suggesting that pre-issue 
dividends are seen to adumbrate future distributions following the issuance.  This is also 
consistent with the observation in Table 4, where PP-firms are the highest and most 
consistent dividend payers.  The results suggest a position whereby PP-firms in particular 
need to attract and retain investors.  Their powerful subscribers possess comparative 
advantages, including the ability to enforce a desired dividend pattern.  Acquiescence on the 
part of the firm helps ensure that the powerful investors do not bail out when the firm goes 
public. 
     Ownership concentration is of considerable importance in shaping market price behaviour. 
It generates a significant negative impact on rights issues (–0.28), open offers (–0.19) and 
particularly private placements (–0.36) at the 5% level. Our results contrast with Xu and 
Wang’s (1999) claim that ownership concentration serves to monitor Chinese firms closely. 
Agency problems permeate fundraising, and public equity investors are poorly equipped to 
monitor managerial planning and discretion.  The stronger effect in the case of private 
placements corroborates our hypothesis that ownership concentration aggravates the conflicts 
between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders who are usually the targeted 
buyers. The role of concentration revealed in our study disagrees with Hertzel and Smith’s 
(1993) report that ownership concentration makes only a minor impact on market returns. 
     Turning to the issue characteristics around the announcement period, we find that the 
discount in subscription price is the significant explanatory factor for the five-day CARs in 
the case of rights issues (–0.42, p<0.05).  As discussed in Section 2 (i), rights issues are often 
made in the interests of the largest shareholders and are rejected by minority shareholders.  
Additionally, more than 60 percent of shares in RI–firms are non-tradable due to their being 
                                                 
9.  In order to govern the dividend payment practice of Chinese firms, the CSRC imposed the “Management of Cash 
Dividends by Listed Companies” in 2006.  However, those firms that made issues prior to 2006 may have failed to 
comply with this regulation.  
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owned by public bodies, including the state. This may generate mistrust in the market.  
Underwriters seek the means of reducing the risk associated with purchasing the shares of a 
potentially failed issue by setting higher discounts, and the market duly responds 
unfavourably in the form of negative market returns. The coefficient on open offers is 
marginally significant.  This may be partly due to the fact that the discount in open offers is 
far less severe than in rights issues (see Table 4).   This may be partly a matter of the 
underwriters’ risk exposure being less significant since any underwriters’ allocations will be 
more easily tradable in view of the opportunity to trade across a wide and highly active 
habitat of investors.  There is no evidence to suggest that the price discount matters in 
convertible issues. This result supports our expectation that investors worry less about the 
level of the price set for convertible issues, as their quality is guaranteed by the high rating. 
     Our findings in the case of private placements are particularly noteworthy.  The price 
discount has a small, negative effect on the five-day CARs with a borderline significance (–
0.08, p<0.10).  However, when we consider the interaction between the discount and target 
buyers, we find a marked, contrasting impact – the force of which depends on the market 
perception of the salient characteristics of targeted investors: notably their risk, reliability and 
attitude to investment.  Specifically, the discount generates a highly significant and negative 
effect when it interacts with the controlling shareholders, DISCBUYERController (–0.36, 
p<0.01) but a positive one when it interacts with institutional investors, DISC
BUYERInstitution (0.27, p<0.05). These results appear to support our expectation that price 
discount conveys to the market the message that private placements are an offer to the largest 
shareholders to the detriment of public investors by way of price manipulation prior to the 
issue and subsequent engagement in related-party transactions. When privately placed shares 
are issued to institutions which have the ability to promote strategic investment, their 
subscription implies that they are both willing and able successfully to promote, pursue and 
consummate such investments – a point noted by Hertzel and Smith (1993).  Hence, the 
certification effect prevails. 
     Overall, our results with respect to the discount in subscription significantly suggest that 
the risk of adverse price effects, the quality of issues, and the agency costs pertaining to each 
type of issuance are taken into account when the new issue is planned.  
     The impact of underwriting appears to differ according to the type of efforts.  The 
underwriting of rights issues has no impact on market price behaviour. This supports our 
expectation concerning the rigidity of the CSRC policy with respect to underwriting a rights 
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issue using the method of best efforts. This required procedure takes insufficient account of 
the potential risk to be borne by the underwriter during the announcement period.  In general, 
the market reacts favourably to the announcement of open offers underwritten by way of 
standby and best efforts (0.24, 0.21, two Ps<0.05), but unfavourably in the case of full 
commitment (–0.33, p<0.05).  Our results for open offers appear to be consonant with the 
adverse selection hypothesis (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992) to the effect that full-commitment 
underwriting occurs when issues are expected to fail, while the opposite holds for standby 
and best efforts.  Further, underwritten private placements experience significant, positive 
market returns, regardless of the level of efforts.  The results suggest that private placements 
are of interest to the market despite any price manipulation prior to the issue, not least given 
the scale of the issues and the opportunity to improve the asset portfolio by introducing cash 
or directly injecting real assets. The market is accordingly willing to acquiesce in the decision 
to underwrite a private placement. By comparison, underwriting a convertible issue by 
standby has a significant, positive influence on market price behaviour (0.21, p<0.05).  This 
is consistent with our expectations based on the instrument’s inherent discipline and issuers’ 
desire to minimise issue costs.  Taken together, although these results do not appear to 
consistently support our hypotheses and those formulated in the standard context by Heinkel 
and Schwartz (1986) and Gopalan et al. (2011), they at least provide an indication that 
underwriters in China differentiate among underwriting methods to signal the quality of a 
new issue while seeking to contain issue costs. 
     The sign on AUDIT is positive for the five-day CARs, as expected, on all equity offerings 
with prestigious auditors.  However, the coefficients are not significant at the 5% level.  
These weak relationships do not support the view of Hay and Davies (2004) and Claessens et 
al. (2002) with respect to the external monitoring role of the quality of auditing, but are 
evidence to the effect that China’s investors have limited confidence in the professional 
competence of auditors.  In our additional regressions, we used the ‘Big 5’ as the measure of 
prestige auditors (not reported).  The significance increases in these regressions but still not 
to a significance level.  Hence, the suggestion remains that the market still doubts the 
credibility of reports issued by the domestic CPAs. The market cannot but be conscious of the 
ineffective surveillance of the quality of corporate reporting and auditing processes. The 
small and non-significant coefficient on convertible issues provide  an indication that the 
market is largely indifferent to the auditor’s prestige, which is consistent with our proposition 
concerning the impact of the regulatory discipline surrounding convertible issues.   
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     As expected, price effects of the size of an offering differ across the forms of seasoned 
offerings.  Size of offering exerts a significant, negative impact on market returns for rights 
issues at –0.40% and for open offers at –0.36%, which are qualitatively consistent with the 
negative market price reactions upon the issue announcements shown in Tables 1 and 2.  One 
could argue that the significant decrease in share price may be the result of price pressure on 
the new shares prompted by increased supply; or that the new issue may convey negative 
signals about issuers’ earning prospects (Miller and Rock, 1985). However, in line with 
China’s position, we submit that marked agency problems associated with the new issues 
amount to a substantial driving force behind these price adjustments.  We observe that 91% 
of the issuers give up their rights as shown in Table 3.  In open offers, issuers exploit the 
opportunity afforded by the lenient regulations that are not available to rights issues to gather 
money on a much larger scale.  According to a number of studies, this leniency is exploited 
as issuers deploy resources into non–profitable projects or undertake tunnelling without any 
accountability on the part of management (Liu et al., 2013).  Further inspection of our data 
confirms that there is a higher percentage of alteration of stated usage in rights issues and 
open offers than in other offerings (not shown). 
     By contrast, a positive result emerges for private placements and convertible issues.  In the 
case of private placements, the positive impact (0.22, p<0.05) appears to reflect market trust 
in institutional subscription because the cash raised will support under-performing firms or 
cater for the firm’s need for strategic cash; these benefits being further compounded by any 
direct injection by controllers of productive assets.  Market trust to this effect offsets anxiety 
about management’s abusive discretionary behaviour in the form of overinvestment and 
related-party transactions with controlling shareholders and other insiders. The favourable 
appraisal of the financing event indicates that for the market the size of offering presages 
valuable productive investments, and may further suggest that investors trust their protective 
measures, privacy and communication associated with private placements. The positive 
impact in convertible issues (0.17, p<0.05) confirms our expectations, and also Stein (1992) 
and Jiraporn and Gleason (2007)’s view, concerning the appeal of convertible bonds to the 
market based on contractual and regulatory control. This result is also consistent with the fact 
that convertible bonds are associated with the major strategic evolution of the corporate plan. 
     Most significantly, the estimates in Table 5 show that the intended use of issue proceeds is 
a distinct determinant of market price behaviour.  Two contrasting findings are particularly 
eloquent in the following.  Firstly, the offerings for high-tech and innovation projects appear 
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to exert highly significant, positive impacts on the five-day CARs, regardless of the type of 
security issued (0.50, 0.49, 0.38, 0.46, all Ps<0.01).  This result is consonant with our 
expectations that market price movement is strongly accounted for by the promise of 
enhancing the firm’s competiveness and prospects by the planned implementation of high-
tech projects.  Further, issues designated to capital expenditure generate significant and 
positive impacts on market returns (0.48, 0.44, 0.50, 0.34, all Ps<0.05).  The favourable 
market responses reinforce the suggestion that these projects are believed by the market to 
enhance firm value by productively increasing the firm’s real asset base.  The increase in 
capital expenditure reduces controlling shareholders’ discretionary opportunities to 
expropriate uncommitted resources against the interests of minority shareholders. 
     Secondly and by way of contrast to the case of issuance for high-tech projects and capital 
expenditure, issues designated to the purposes of financing inter-firm projects generate a 
highly significant and negative price effect, regardless of the form of issuance, but most 
notably in the case of private placements (–0.53, p<0.01).  It appears that the market 
identifies such intentions with rent-seeking by means of the new issue, and infers that ex post 
the danger of related-party transactions is most likely to occur.  Further, the market responds 
negatively to the news of resources being committed to refinancing debt and working capital, 
regardless of the form of issuance.  These price effects respond to actions which do not 
change the firm’s investment in productive assets appreciably if at all, but do serve to 
increase free cash flow or meet cash flow shortfalls.  These results lend support to Walker 
and Yost (2008) and appear to be plausible in China’s culturally distinct, opaque market, 
where exploitable discretionary funds all too often precipitate moral hazard, leading to the 
managerial pursuit of personal interests at the expense of external investors. 
      Most significantly, the intended use of issue proceeds generates the most powerful impact 
of any variable on market returns and is the main force in shaping market price movement 
following the announcement. This disagrees with Denis (1994) who suggests that investment 
opportunities announcements play a small role in adjusting market prices.  The overall 
findings corroborate our suggestion that the market has insight into the motivation and 
economic significance of the intended use. 
     The capital structure measure generates consistent results.  The coefficients on the ΔDE 
ratio are negative with regard to rights issues (–0.24), open offers (–0.21) and private 
placements (–0.34) at the 5% level, with convertible bonds being –0.14 at the 10% level.  
This suggests that the resulting decrease in DE ratio following the issuance reduces the 
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discipline exerted on management and facilitates rent–seeking behaviour on the part of 
powerful issuers, as predicted in Myers (1984).  The stronger market movement in plain 
equity offerings is consistent with Chen (2004) to the effect that the management of Chinese 
firms prefer equity to debt – a decision that brings into play the agency issues which beset the 
market.  The market duly responds unfavourably to equity issues. 
    Regarding the security-specific characteristics, we find a highly significant, positive price 
effect if rights are taken up (0.31,
 
p<0.01). Take-up reassures a market that the abuses 
associated with rights issues will be less likely to occur or will at least be on a smaller scale. 
Such reassurance is valuable in a regime where rights are usually implemented in favour of 
informed, state-controlled shareholders who are in a position to garner rewards by renouncing 
rights and diverting issue proceeds, leading to a loss of value for the public.  Our result is 
qualitatively consistent with that of Slovin et al. (2000) regarding the potential quality 
dimension associated with this variable, and provides a clear indication that in accordance 
with our hypothesis that rights issues are exposed to agency risks. 
     Further, we take a closer look at the role of target buyers in the case of private placements.  
When these buyers are controlling shareholders, a highly significant and negative impact on 
market returns occurs (–0.33, p<0.05). The negative price reaction appears to contradict the 
majority of previous studies and theory predictions (e.g., Wruck, 1989; Chakraborty and 
Gantchev, 2013), but supports our proposal that in the case of China, the market believes that 
the controlling shareholders who are target buyers have strong incentives to engage in 
related-party transactions and overinvestment.  Abuses exploit the typical pyramidal 
ownership structure and intra-group cross-holdings as noted in Liu et al. (2013). Together 
with the reported evidence from the discount in subscription price, the results markedly 
underpin our confidence that when the targeted buyer is the controlling shareholder, private 
placements are a means of issuance that are beset with agency problems which aggravate the 
tension between the controlling and minority shareholders.  However in the case where the 
target buyer is the institutional investor, the certification effect asserts itself. 
     No reliably significant excess stock returns are observed for convertible issues that are 
rated AA and above, with the five-day CARs being 0.08 at the 10% level.  Our result 
contrasts with the more common suggestion – notably the findings of Poon and Chan  (2008) 
which are based on the data available for one of China’s domestic credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) for the period 1997–2003 – suggesting that ratings generate certification effects.  On 
the basis of credit rating reports issued by all qualified domestic CRAs, our results show that 
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the ratings assigned by the CRAs do not convey any new information to the market about the 
credit risk of convertible bonds.  Our findings disagree with the implication of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) concerning the relevance of ratings to investors including their ability to 
reduce informational asymmetries.  Rather, our findings favour the contrary position to the 
effect that ratings are substantially unheeded (Kennedy, 2003; Lee, 2006).  Ratings’ visible 
lack of signalling power confirms our doubts concerning the efficacy of credit ratings due to 
the uniform credit criteria set out by the CSRC, which may place the independence of the 
agencies and quality of their grading under question.  
Insert Table 5 here. 
(4) Robustness Check and Sensitivity Analysis  
 
Endogeneity 
 
Thus far, we have not considered any potential self–selection bias that might arise as a result 
of firms self–selecting their issue methods.  One cannot rule out the possibility, however, that 
high-market-return firms are more likely to select open issues; low-market-return firms tend 
to select rights issues; firms with lower leverage, or whose stock has high market liquidity, 
are more inclined to opt for convertible issues; and those with a desire to retain corporate 
control are more prone to choose private placings. In such a case, our previous results, based 
on the sample of issuing firms, may be subject to self-selection bias in estimated CAR 
coefficients due to the potential endogeneity of the data.  We address this issue by way of the 
Heckman (1979) two-stage regression approach to take into account the self-selection of the 
issue method.  In the first stage, we carry out a Probit regression in which the likelihood of 
the choice of issue method, denoted by Pr(ISSUE), is regressed on a set of variables that 
might play a role in the firm’s issue method decision. This uses the entire sample, including 
both issuing and non-issuing firms, on the basis of Equation (5). We then compute the inverse 
Mills ratio (non-selection hazard), denoted by Lambda, from the first-stage Probit estimates 
of Equation (5), and incorporate Lambda into the second-stage regressions to account for any 
potential endogeneity. The first-stage selection equation is expressed as follows:  
(5)       
)Pr(
,,1,1
,1,1,,20,150,1,10,
tititi
titititititi
dummiesyeardummyindustryMANSIZE
LEVMBCARLIQVOLATISSUE



 
 
where ISSUEi,t is coded as one for each of the issue methods for firm i in year t,  and zero 
otherwise. Market volatility (VOLAT) is measured as the standard deviation of daily return 
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over the preceding three months on the rolling basis. Liquidity (LIQ) is the relative bid-ask 
spread measured as the dealer’s bid-ask spread divided by the average of the bid-price and the 
ask-price.  CAR (CAR–150, –20) is measured as the abnormal return between –150 and – 20 
trading days on the rolling basis.  Market-to-book ratio (MB) is measured as the sum of assets 
plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity, divided by assets.  Leverage 
(LEV) is measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation, adjusted by the inflation rate in the 
corresponding year.  Managerial ownership (MAN) is measured as the percentage of 
outstanding shares owned by managers. Year and industry dummies are included to control 
for year and industry fixed effects, and i,t is an error term.
10
  The rationale of independent 
variables is described below. 
     The decision to implement a new issue may depend on a variety of factors, including the 
stock market condition of an individual stock, firm-specific features, and ownership and 
control considerations.  To measure the stock market condition of an individual stock, we use 
market volatility (VOLAT), market liquidity (LIQ), and market price performance (CAR–150, –
20).  To capture firm-specific features, we use the firm’s potential growth (MB), leverage 
(LEV), and firm size (SIZE). To measure the effect of ownership and control considerations, 
we use managerial ownership (MAN).  We also include the stock’s market uncertainty and 
market liquidity, because the decision to issue may systematically differ between firms, given 
that each issue method exposes firms to different levels of market uncertainty and market 
liquidity. High market volatility for rights issues may induce management to issue shares by 
means of an open offer (Barnes and Walker, 2006).  The market liquidity conditions of an 
individual stock may be instrumental in influencing the firm’s choice of issue method, 
presenting the market with different levels of information friction and costs of trading stocks 
(Butler et al., 2005).  Managers may exploit security mispricing and timing exercising issues 
in their belief that the firm is overvalued when a variety of issue methods are permitted 
(Cready and Gurun, 2010).  We include the measures for firm-specific characteristics, because 
a firm’s growth potential and financial structure may influence market perception of the firm 
and hence the interests of investors (Liu et al., 2013).  The decision to issue may 
                                                 
10.  According to the 2012 CSRC Guidance for Industry Classification of Listed Companies, the sample firms are classified 
into 13 broad industries. Each firm is grouped into one of the industries in each year as;  Agriculture; Mining, 
Manufacturing, Utility, Construction, Transportation, Information Technology, Retail and Wholesale, Real Estate, 
Financial Institutions (the firms in this industry are excluded from this study), Services, News and Media, and 
Conglomerates. The industry variable in this study is a time-varying variable. 
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systematically differ between well- and under-performing firms as well as high- and low-
growth firms (Jain and Kini, 1999).  Further, leverage can transgress corporate debt capacity, 
leading to distress.  A seasoned equity issue which affects the debt ratio beyond its optimal 
level would pose a serious threat to the firm’s continuity, and thus influence the 
management’s issue method decision, especially in the case of financially-distressed firms 
(Myers, 1984).  Further, larger firms tend to have a lower degree of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry, but at the same time a greater need for financial resources and 
financial mobility to meet the demand for future investment because of the scale of their 
operations (Jain and Kini, 1999).  Notably in China, private placements and convertible bonds 
are preferred, partly because of the cap imposed by the CSRC on rights issues, and later on 
cash offers, in order to restore order in the issuing market, which would otherwise have been 
exploited by self-interest-driven issuers (see Table A1).  Finally, the firm’s issue decision 
may be driven by corporate ownership and control considerations.  Equity issues dilute 
ownership, which is likely to militate against the managerial control of the firm, deterring 
management from making issues (Masulis, 1986).   
     Section A in Table 6 presents the first-stage estimates.  Overall, we find that the issuer's 
desire to increase the stock’s market liquidity has a significant influence on the issuing 
decision, regardless of the specific issue method concerned. At the same time, the issuer’s 
capital structure does not appear to influence the issue method chosen, even in the case of 
convertible bond issues, and hence does not appear to fit as well as the capital structure 
hypothesis (Myers, 1984) would suggest.  Our further results show that the other variables 
generate differential impacts on the likelihood of the issue method decision.  Lower market 
volatility and lower growth potential make the firm more likely to opt for a rights issue.  
Larger market volatility and greater upward price movement tend to induce the firm to issue 
shares by means of an open offer.  Moreover, lower abnormal returns and a stronger incentive 
to keep ownership and control over the firm lead to a greater propensity to raise equity capital 
by way of private placements.  Greater growth prospects and larger firm size are more likely 
to give management an incentive to raise cash through convertible issues. 
     Section B reports the second-stage regression results following adjustment for self-
selection by incorporating Lambda in the regression models. We cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no sample selection bias, i.e. H0: beta lambda = 0, because all P values 
are greater than 0.10 in all four cases. Our results, thus, do not suggest the presence of sample 
selection bias. Furthermore, corrections for potential self-selection bias have not altered the 
main results shown in Table 5. The coefficients of the size of the offering continue to be 
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significant and negative in the case of rights issues and open offers, while the opposite holds 
true in the case of private placements and convertible issues.  The results of the other 
controlled variables remain similar to those reported in Table 5 in terms of statistical 
significance and sign. Hence, our overall results do not indicate that potential selection bias 
due to endogeneity is a serious concern for our estimates. 
 
Analysis of the Announcement Period Window [0, +2] 
 
We conducted further analysis of the issue announcement period CARs over the time window 
of the announcement day, and two days afterwards [0, +2].  We used abnormal returns over 
the [0, +2] window as the dependent variable.  The results are reported in Table 7.  Compared 
to Table 5, it appears that the variables featuring the pre-issue characteristics become less 
significant in terms of the statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficients for the 
three-day announcement period abnormal returns, except in the case of ownership 
concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index. On the contrary, the variables featuring 
issue characteristics and, in particular, security-specific features, generate more significant 
and stronger impacts on the three-day announcement period abnormal returns in the majority 
of cases. Specifically, the size of the offering (OFFER) and intended usage of issue proceeds 
(FUSETech, FUSEFixed, FUSEIntra, and FUSEDWC) stand out, especially in the case of rights 
issues and open offers. 
     Our results consistently suggest that a temporary increase in firm value following the 
announcement of an issue is associated with seasoned offerings in terms of the size and scale 
of the issuance itself, and the subsequent usage of issue proceeds that are intended for high-
tech projects and fixed investments.  Firm value experiences a temporary reduction when 
funds are claimed for inter-firm use and debt and working capital refinancing, reinforcing our 
prior results and remaining consistent with the agency cost.  In comparison to the five-day 
announcement period CARs as reported in Table 5, the stronger impacts of rights take-up 
(TAKEUP) and targeted investors (BUYER) substantiate our prior observations that the take-
up of the rights by the largest shareholders in a rights issue and the type of targeted buyers in 
a private placement issue strong signals to the market when it forms a perception on the 
outlook of issuers and hence the interests of investors.  Overall, the apparent market price 
movements in the three-day announcement period provide clear evidence to suggest that the 
market is more reactive to the characteristics featuring the issuer and issue in the first three 
days after the issue announcement.   
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Insert Table 7 here. 
Analysis of the Offer Period Window from the Day before the Offer Period to the Offer 
Expiry Date [–A1, X0] 
Evidence in the existing literature suggests that the offer period may influence the specific 
impact of the occurrence of an event (e.g., Heinkel and Schwartz, 1986; Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). We therefore perform further tests on the offer period from the day before 
the offer period to the offer expiry date [–A1, X0].  The mean (median) duration between the 
announcement date and the offer expiry date in our sample is 30 (33) days.  We use abnormal 
returns over the [–A1, X0] window as the dependent variable.  The results are reported in 
Table 8.  The majority of the results are qualitatively similar to those reported for the five-day 
announcement CARs. Specifically, the coefficients of discount in the subscription price 
(DISC), intended use of issue proceeds (USETech, FUSEFixed, FUSEIntra, and FUSEDWC), size of 
offering (OFFER), underwriting (UNDER), rights take-up (TAKEUP) and targeted investors 
(BUYER) have the same sign with statistical significance, regardless of the type of issuance.  
Auditing (AUDIT) and credit ratings (RATE) continue to appear not to be statistically related 
to the CARs while analysts’ forecasts (FCASTdiverg) are shown to be marginally related to the 
CARs in the plain equity offerings, providing further support for the weak association 
between these variables and market returns as identified in our primary analyses.  The signs 
and significance of other variables, such as price run-up, dividend payment practice, 
ownership concentration and debt-equity ratio, remain largely unchanged in comparison with 
those from our primary model, except in the case of the market-to-book ratio (MBpre-issue) and 
firm size (SIZEpre-issue). We are therefore able to conclude that these results largely support 
our main findings. 
     Further, we conduct diagnostic tests on multicollinearity in our regressions. The presence 
of multicollinearity among independent variables can inflate standard errors, which may 
result in less-efficient parameter estimates. To assess this possibility, we conduct two tests of 
multicollinearity. First, we check correlations among the independent variables using the 
correlation matrix. The values range between 0.02 and 0.67, with none exceeding the 0.80 
threshold (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Second, we conduct a variance-inflation-factor (VIF) 
test.  The values range between 1.25 and 3.49, and none is above the VIF threshold of 10 
(O’Brien, 2007).  These two tests justify our confidence to the effect that multicollinearity is 
not a problem in our regressions.  
Insert Table 8 here. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
By reference to 1,659 seasoned issues over the period 1991–2010, we seek to identify and 
analyse the factors which most powerfully explain the market reaction across the full range of 
seasoned issuance methods used by Chinese companies.  In so doing, we increase insight into 
an emerging market’s progress towards pricing efficiency and also into the factors that both 
assist and hinder such progress, paying due attention to the activities of influential capital 
providers, market monitors and financial infrastructure builders.  
     Our research questions and the attendant hypotheses yield instructive results.  Our results 
demonstrate that market reactions differ in ways that suggest a difference between 
management’s internal assessment and the market’s assessment of stock price across the 
different types of issuance.  Open offers and notably rights offers are unfavourably received.  
Convertible issues generate the most positive signals. Private placements experience an 
unfavourable pre-announcement reaction, which contrasts with the favourable reaction after 
the event. Our further investigation shows that market reaction is related to factors specific to 
issuer and issue, as well as matters specific to the context of China by reference to the period 
immediately surrounding the issuance.   
     Our research recognises the progress of China towards greater market transparency and 
more effective regulation, directed at inhibiting and remedying corporate and individual 
misbehaviour.  This regulation helps to generate information that can signal the quality of a 
new issue.  Despite such progress, public incredulity emerges strongly from our further 
exploration of the drive behind the price movements surrounding issuance. Such incredulity 
is reflected in the insignificance that the market attributes to relatively unreliable criteria, 
namely analysts’ earnings forecasts, the potency of the underwriting process, ratings, and the 
quality of auditing services. Concerns such as these are consistent with public scepticism with 
respect to both management and their gatekeepers.  These limitations, in turn, epitomise the 
constraints within the existing system, where the prevention, control and resolution of market 
risks are largely dependent on policy adjustments, covenants and other security safeguards.  
The auditing and ratings professions remain regulated by the government, while the utility of 
auditing services and credit ratings are not yet fully realised in this less than efficient capital 
market.  Their role does not appear to enjoy the degree of credibility that applies in more 
mature regimes.   
     We have reported wide-ranging evidence that public incredulity is well founded.  Our 
results consistently reveal a lack, inadequacy or failure of investor-relevant market 
mechanisms which would help to reduce informational asymmetries.  Specifically, we find 
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evidence of interfering with the market pricing process and the exploitation of resources by 
powerful, self-seeking control groupings.  These occur both in the lead-up to and in the 
aftermath of a security offering and are designed to generate gains at the expense of minority 
investors and other outsiders.  Rights issues, open offers, and private placements are 
particularly affected by agency costs including those of free cash flow. They carry relatively 
light contractual obligations and can be driven by short-termism and perverse personal 
incentives.  In a setting of informational asymmetries, this degree of managerial discretion 
compounds a sense of uncertainty.  Such imperfections are aggravated by ineffective 
monitoring and lead to a material departure from shareholder wealth maximisation. Powerful 
managers can and do abuse and misappropriate acquired funds. The active involvement of 
moneyed interests, including the state, is a pervading influence. In the case of convertible 
bond issues, credible regulatory discipline considerably reduces dysfunctional opportunities. 
     Centrally, the picture is of a market in progress, contending with agency costs, incredulity 
and misbehaviour.  Our salient conclusion, as reflected throughout the results, is, accordingly, 
that market reaction betokens the evolving but still immature state of China’s equity 
marketplace and the status of their imperfect corporate control. 
     Our findings carry policy implications. The identification of the distinctiveness, impacts 
and threats of the forms of equity issuance suggests where remedial action towards greater 
market efficiency might be directed. The rewards are more productive capital allocation and 
apposite financing arrangements with sufficient protection of investors.  By way of future 
research, we hope that our work will stimulate enquiry into its implications for China’s 
increasingly international equity issuance. New insights stand to be gained into the 
perspicacity of the securities market and the quality of information.  Such further enquiry will 
help to meet the demands of the growing number of sophisticated international investors in 
China with an interest in the local sourcing of funds and funding partnerships. All of these 
phenomena will advance China’s financial market in its progress towards greater efficiency, 
completeness and maturity. 
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Table 1 
Daily Abnormal Returns (ARs) around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method 
 
           Rights  Issues    Open Offers Private Placements      Convertible Bond Issues 
Day(s) Mean       SE Mean  SE Mean  SE Mean  SE 
             
–30 0.0001  (0.0024) –0.0008 *
* 
(0.0004) –0.0020  (0.0068) –0.0010  (0.0007) 
–29 0.0002  (0.0021) –0.0009  (0.0058) –0.0023  (0.0032) 0.0013 * (0.0007) 
–28 –0.0006  (0.0022) 0.0053  (0.0057) 0.0041 * (0.0024) 0.0014  (0.0027) 
–27 –0.0009 * (0.0005) 0.0057  (0.0061) –0.0013  (0.0032) 0.0021 ** (0.0009) 
–26 –0.0012  (0.0022) –0.0002  (0.0055) –0.0011  (0.0027) –0.0001  (0.0017) 
–25 0.0008  (0.0022) –0.0040  (0.0061) 0.0004  (0.0031) 0.0018  (0.0025) 
–24 –0.0013  (0.0018) –0.0021  (0.0054) 0.0015  (0.0033) –0.0002  (0.0023) 
–23 –0.0001  (0.0019) –0.0034  (0.0064) –0.0021 ** (0.0010) (0.0002  (0.0023) 
–22 0.0007  (0.0020) –0.0013  (0.0062) –0.0013  (0.0033) 0.0009  (0.0025) 
–21 –0.0015 * (0.0008) 0.0044 * (0.0023) 0.0011  (0.0029) 0.0013  (0.0021) 
–20 –0.0011  (0.0023) –0.0040  (0.0068) –0.0009  (0.0032) 0.0021 * (0.0012) 
–19 –0.0014  (0.0022) –0.0021  (0.0068) –0.0016  (0.0029) 0.0015  (0.0022) 
–18 –0.0034 * (0.0018) –0.0038  (0.0090) –0.0018 ** (0.0008) 0.0038  (0.0025) 
–17 –0.0016  (0.0022) 0.0043  (0.0070) –0.0012  (0.0033) 0.0037 * (0.0021) 
–16 –0.0012  (0.0024) –0.0026  (0.0075) –0.0026 * (0.0015) 0.0009  (0.0024) 
–15 –0.0008  (0.0022) –0.0037  (0.0056) –0.0005  (0.0033) –0.0006  (0.0025) 
–14 –0.0013  (0.0019) –0.0024  (0.0043) 0.0001  (0.0030) 0.0012  (0.0025) 
–13 –0.0009  (0.0024) –0.0002  (0.0036) –0.0027  (0.0032) –0.0008  (0.0027) 
–12 0.0002  (0.0024) 0.0028  (0.0025) –0.0013  (0.0033) 0.0018  (0.0018) 
–11 –0.0007  (0.0022) 0.0030  (0.0059) –0.0016  (0.0030) 0.0024 * (0.0013) 
–10 –0.0011 * (0.0006) 0.0052  (0.0060) –0.0025  (0.0033) 0.0035  (0.0026) 
–9 –0.0009  (0.0022) 0.0029 * (0.0017) –0.0022  (0.0033) –0.0009  (0.0025) 
–8 0.0003  (0.0019) –0.0017  (0.0064) –0.0084 ** (0.0034) 0.0037 ** (0.0016) 
–7 –0.0013  (0.0018) 0.0028  (0.0064) –0.0012  (0.0033) –0.0028  (0.0021) 
–6 –0.0021  (0.0024) 0.0041 * (0.0024) 0.0007  (0.0034) 0.0019  (0.0023) 
–5 –0.0037 * (0.0020) 0.0032  (0.0066) –0.0013  (0.0030) 0.0022 ** (0.0011) 
–4 –0.0014  (0.0020) 0.0081  (0.0078) –0.0049 ** (0.0025) 0.0019  (0.0021) 
–3 –0.0021 * (0.0012) 0.0103 * (0.0061) –0.0033 * (0.0019) 0.0018 * (0.0010) 
–2 –0.0019 ** (0.0008) 0.0051 * (0.0030) –0.0028 * (0.0017) 0.0018 ** (0.0008) 
–1 –0.0013 **
* 
(0.0005) 0.0042 *
* 
(0.0018) –0.0026 ** (0.0012) 0.0021 ** (0.0009) 
AD –0.0063 **
* 
(0.0016) –0.0056 *
*
* 
(0.0021) –0.0037 *** (0.0014) 0.0039 *** (0.0002) 
1 –0.0048 ** (0.0019) –0.0048 *
*
* 
(0.0018) 0.0051 *** (0.0002) 0.0028 *** (0.0003) 
2 –0.0021 ** (0.0010) –0.0025 * (0.0014) 0.0048 ** (0.0024) 0.0021 ** (0.0009) 
3 –0.0019 ** (0.0009) –0.0035 *
* 
(0.0017) 0.0035 ** (0.0017) 0.0027 ** (0.0013) 
4 –0.0021 * (0.0011) –0.0019 *
* 
(0.0009) 0.0023 * (0.0014) 0.0015 * (0.0008) 
5 –0.0016 * (0.0009) –0.0013 * (0.0007) 0.0012 ** (0.0006) 0.0014 * (0.0008) 
6 0.0014 * (0.0008) –0.0012 * (0.0007) 0.0023 * (0.0014) 0.0019 ** (0.0009) 
7 –0.0009 ** (0.0004) –0.0037 *
* 
(0.0018) 0.0012  (0.0032) 0.0045 * (0.0025) 
8 –0.0011  (0.0042) –0.0034  (0.0039) 0.0011  (0.0032) 0.0005  (0.0024) 
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9 –0.0029 * (0.0017) –0.0016  (0.0025) 0.0019 * (0.0010) –0.0009 * (0.0005) 
10 0.0013  (0.0030) –0.0012 * (0.0007) –0.0003  (0.0029) 0.0013  (0.0019) 
11 –0.0019 * (0.0010) 0.0008  (0.0061) –0.0006  (0.0023) 0.0014  (0.0018) 
12 –0.0008  (0.0031) 0.0005  (0.0038) 0.0021 * (0.0012) 0.0046 ** (0.0023) 
13 –0.0005  (0.0032) 0.0011  (0.0027) 0.0014  (0.0032) 0.0011  (0.0025) 
14 0.0006  (0.0018) –0.0029 * (0.0016) 0.0014  (0.0035) 0.0012  (0.0018) 
15 –0.0011  (0.0028) –0.0012  (0.0038) 0.0033 ** (0.0016) 0.0016 * (0.0009) 
16 –0.0017 ** (0.0007) –0.0027  (0.0065) 0.0016  (0.0031) –0.0004  (0.0025) 
17 0.0003  (0.0035) –0.0003  (0.0063) –0.0010  (0.0030) 0.0001  (0.0021) 
18 –0.0019  (0.0027) –0.0027 * (0.0016) 0.0016  (0.0033) 0.0007  (0.0024) 
19 –0.0024  (0.0015) 0.0004  (0.0067) 0.0010  (0.0035) 0.0036 ** (0.0018) 
20 –0.0022 * (0.0013) 0.0006  (0.0056) 0.0027 ** (0.0013) 0.0024  (0.0023) 
21 0.0008  (0.0145) –0.0014  (0.0074) 0.0018  (0.0033) 0.0041 * (0.0022) 
22 –0.0019  (0.0150) –0.0010  (0.0066) 0.0004  (0.0033) 0.0029  (0.0025) 
23 –0.0021 * (0.0012) –0.0006  (0.0052) 0.0007  (0.0034) 0.0032 * (0.0018) 
24 0.0004  (0.0147) –0.0008  (0.0076) –0.0002  (0.0035) 0.0013  (0.0022) 
25 –0.0016  (0.0149) –0.0023  (0.0077) –0.0003  (0.0029) 0.0004  (0.0024) 
26 –0.0019 ** (0.0009) 0.0005  (0.0075) 0.0014 * (0.0008) 0.0006  (0.0026) 
27 –0.0014  (0.0106) 0.0007  (0.0046) 0.0016  (0.0033) 0.0029 ** (0.0014) 
28 –0.0004  (0.0111) –0.0011  (0.0074) 0.0017  (0.0033) –0.0008  (0.0024) 
29 –0.0012  (0.0132) –0.0024 *
* 
(0.0012) 0.0031 ** (0.0015) 0.0014  (0.0025) 
30 –0.0011  (0.0160) –0.0020  (0.0046) –0.0001  (0.0031) 0.0012 * (0.0007) 
Before AD             
Mean  –0.0011   0.0013   –0.0015   0.0013   
Minimum –0.0037   –0.0040   –0.0084   –0.0028   
25th centile –0.0014   –0.0021   –0.0025   0.0004   
Median –0.0012   0.0013   –0.0015   0.0017   
75th centile –0.0006   0.0043   –0.0010   0.0021   
Maximum 0.0008   0.0103   0.0041   0.0038   
After AD             
Mean  –0.0014   –0.0015   0.0014   0.0018   
Minimum –0.0063   –0.0056   –0.0037   –0.0009   
25th centile –0.0020   –0.0026   0.0006   0.0009   
Median –0.0016   –0.0013   0.0014   0.0014   
75th centile –0.0007   –0.0005   0.0022   0.0029   
Maximum 0.0014   0.0011   0.0051   0.0046   
Observations 931   175   340   81   
 
Note: 
This table reports mean daily abnormal returns and the standardised residual t–tests (SRT) for Equation (1) based on the market 
model for the issue announcements by way of rights issues, open offers, private placements and convertible bond issues.   
SE denotes standard error.  
AD denotes announcement date. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two-sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
56 
 
Table 2 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method 
 
        Rights Issues           Open Offers      Private Placements Convertible Bond Issues 
CAR [Event window] Mean  SE Mean  SE Mean SE Mean SE 
             
CAR [–20, –1] –0.0277 ** (0.0137) 0.0355 *** (0.0185) –0.0426 ** (0.0211) 0.0312  (0.0216) 
CAR [–10, –1] –0.0155  (0.0258) 0.0442  (0.0407) –0.0285  (0.0190) 0.0152  (0.0209) 
CAR [–5, –1] –0.0104 * (0.0056) 0.0309  (0.0210) –0.0149 ** (0.0066) 0.0098  (0.0060) 
CAR [–2, –1] –0.0032 * (0.0018) 0.0093 * (0.0049) –0.0054 * (0.0028) 0.0039 * (0.0021) 
CAR [–1,  0] –0.0076 * (0.0042) –0.0014  (0.0016) –0.0063 * (0.0034) 0.0060 * (0.0032) 
CAR [–1, +1] –0.0124  (0.0120) –0.0062 ** (0.0031) –0.0012 * (0.0007) 0.0088 ** (0.0035) 
CAR [–2, +2] –0.0164 *** (0.0023) –0.0036 ** (0.0018) 0.0008 *** (0.0003) 0.0127 ** (0.0057) 
CAR [0, +2] –0.0132 ** (0.0067) –0.0129 ** (0.0065) 0.0062 *** (0.0021) 0.0088 * (0.0045) 
CAR [+1, +5] –0.0125 ** (0.0054) –0.0140 ** (0.0072) 0.0169 ** (0.0086) 0.0105 ** (0.0046) 
CAR [+1, +10] –0.0147 * (0.0083) –0.0251 ** (0.0115) 0.0231 * (0.0137) 0.0178 * (0.0093) 
CAR [+1, +20] –0.0263 ** (0.0124) –0.0315 *** (0.0127) 0.0366 * (0.0195) 0.0341  (0.0218) 
Observations 931   175   340  81  
 
Note: 
The table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the standardised residual t–tests (SRT) for Equation (2) 
based on the market model for various windows around the issue announcements by way of rights issues, open offers, private 
placements and convertible bond issues. Event window [–day, +day] refers to the time period from the number of days 
before the announcement date to the number of days after the announcement date. 
SE denotes standard error. 
*, ** and ***denote statistical significance based on two–sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Definition of Variables 
         Description Variable Definition and Measurement  
Pre–issue characteristics   
Market–to–book ratio  MBPre-issue [Total assets + market value of equity – book value of  equity] / total assets 
prior to the issue  
Analyst’s forecasts FCASTDiverg Divergence between the analyst’s forecasts and actual earnings for the year 
in which the new issue is undertaken  
Run–up in stock prices RUNUP Market–adjusted abnormal returns over the 180-day window [–181, –1] with 
using the value–weighted market index as the benchmark. The market index 
is the Shanghai and Shenzhen value–weighted return for the firms listed in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, respectively. 
Dividend payment DIV 
 
Dummy variable carries value of 1 if the issuer paid dividends in the two 
years prior to the issue; 0 otherwise  
Ownership concentration Herf1; Herf3 Herfindahl index measured as the sum of the squared percentage of shares 
held by the largest shareholder (Herf1) or as the sum of the squared 
percentage of shares held by the largest three shareholders within the firm 
(Herf3), as at the balance sheet date immediately prior to the issue 
announcement 
Firm size   SIZEPre-issue 
 
Natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation prior to the issue, 
adjusted by the inflation rate in the corresponding year 
   
Issue characteristics   
Discount in subscription price  
 
DISC Discount rate measured by , where  is the average 
closing price for the 20 trading days prior to the issue announcement date, 
 is the subscription price for the new shares 
Underwriting UnderStandby Dummy variable for standby method carries value of 1; 0 otherwise 
 UnderBest Dummy variable for best effort method carries value of 1; 0 otherwise 
 UnderFull Dummy variable for full commitment method carries value of 1; 0 otherwise 
 UnderNone  
Auditor quality AUDIT Dummy variable carries value of 1 if the auditor is a Top–10 auditor; 0 
otherwise 
Size of offering 
 
OfferALL 
OfferRI 
OfferOO 
OfferPP 
OfferCV 
OfferALL, OfferRI, OfferOO, OfferPP and OfferCV measured as the ratio of gross 
proceeds raised through all issues combined, rights issues, open  offers, 
private placements and convertible bond issues, respectively, over the firm’s 
market capitalisation at the accounting year end preceding the issue 
Intended use of issue proceeds FUSETech Dummy variable for innovation and high–tech projects carries value of 1; 0 
otherwise 
 FUSEFixed  Dummy variable for general fixed investment carries value of 1; 0 otherwise  
 FUSEIntra Dummy variable for intra–firm investment carries value of 1; 0 otherwise 
 FUSEDWC Dummy variable for repayment of debt or financing working capital needs 
carries value of 1; 0 otherwise 
Change in capital structure ΔDE Total book value of short term and long term debt divided by the market 
value of the firm, adjusted by the size of offering, as defined in Equation (4) 
   
Security–specific characteristics 
Take–up of the rights by the largest 
shareholders in rights issues 
TAKEUP  Dummy variable in the case of a rights issue carries value of 1 if the largest 
shareholders take up the rights; 0 if they renounce the rights 
Target buyer in private placements BUYER 
BUYERController 
BUYERInstitution 
 Dummy variable in the case of a private placement carries value of 1 if the 
shares are sold to the controlling shareholders; 0 if they are sold to 
institutional investors 
Credit rating for convertible issues RATE  Dummy variable in the case of a convertible issue carries value of 1 if the 
convertible is assigned AA+ and above; 0 if the rating is below AA+ but 
above A– 
**
20, /)( PPP tsub  20, tsubP
*P
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics for Variables in Regression Analysis 
 Total Sample Rights Issues Open Offers Private Placements Convertible  Bond Issues 
Pre–issue characteristics           
MBPre-issue          2.3794 1.4848 1.6224 1.8236 1.7553 1.6198 1.5456 1.7523 1.4141 0.1881 
FCASTDiverg –0.00009 0.0009 –0.00003 0.0045 0.00017 0.0032 0.00005 0.0459 –0.00001 0.0115 
RUNUP 0.1549 0.2561 0.1915 0.4943 0.2856 0.1713 –0.0329 0.3188 0.1024 0.1473 
DIV 1108 0.7247 578 0.6208 162 0.9310 301 0.8776 67 0.8272 
Herf3 0.1982 0.1486 0.2034 0.1472 0.1532 0.1351 0.1767 0.1421 0.3382 0.1626 
SIZEPre-issue  18.8675 0.9610 17.6036 0.7858 18.2577 0.8729 18.1481 0.9337 20.9898 1.2154 
           
Issue characteristics           
DISC 0.5033 1.2042 0.6655 0.934 0.1246 0.1027 0.0965 1.2036 –0.0316 0.3969 
UNDERBest 835 0.6185 694 1.00 139 0.4947 2 0.0066 0 0 
UNDERFull 74 0.0548 0 0 64 0.2278 10 0.0329 0 0 
UNDERStandby 210 0.1556 0 0 55 0.1957 84 0.2763 71 1.00 
UNDERNone 231 0.1711 0 0 23 0.0819 208 0.6842  0 
AUDITTop10 537 35.1943 369 0.3968 98 0.5612 137 0.4029 39 0.49312 
AUDITNon–Top10 836 54.8139 562 0.6032 77 0.4388 203 0.5971 41 0.5070 
Size of offering 0.3093 0.3413 0.2907 0.2125 0.4720 0.6165 0.5851 0.6638 0.6791 0.3202 
FUSETech 403 0.2353 221 0.2374 41 0.2020 132 0.2651 9 0.1111 
FUSEFixed 660 0.3853 443 0.4758 65 0.3202 122 0.2450 30 0.3704 
FUSEIntra 362 0.2113 139 0.1493 43 0.2118 162 0.3253 18 0.2222 
FUSEDWC 128 0.0747 55 0.0591 28 0.1379 35 0.0703 10 0.1235 
FUSEOther 160 0.0934 73 0.0784 26 0.1281 47 0.0944 14 0.1728 
ΔDE 0.1287 0.3606 0.1085 0.2406 0.1926 0.3264 0.1755 0.5680 0.1346 0.2419 
           
Security–specific characteristics           
TAKEUP 86 0.0924 86 0.0924       
NON–TAKEUP 845 0.9076 845 0.9076       
BUYERController 137 40.4130     137 40.4130   
BUYERInstitution 202 59.5870     202 59.5870   
Rate (AA+ and above) 46 56.7901      46 56.7901 
Rate (below AA+ but above A– 35 43.2099      35 43.2099 
Note: 
Table 4 reports the basic characteristics of variables across the four types of seasoned issuance. For continuous variables, the reported figures are the median and standard deviation; for 
categorical variables, the reported figures are the number and percentage. Continuous variables refer to MB, FCASTdiverg, RUNUP, Herf3, SIZE, DISC, Size of offering, and ΔDE.  The 
remaining variables are categorical variables. 
For the definition of the variables, see Table 3.
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Table 5 
Regression Results of the Five–day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs [–2, +2])  
around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method 
 
Variable Rights Issues Open Offers Private Placements   Convertible Bond Issues 
Pre–issue characteristics        
MBPre-issue –0.303 
** 0.273 *** –0.226 * 0.114 * 
  (0.150)  (0.106)  (0.119)  (0.067) 
 
FCASTDiverg 0.156 
* 0.208 * 0.268 * 0.194 ** 
 (0.089)  (0.126)  (0.145)  (0.096) 
 
RUNUP –0.283 *** 0.372 *** 0.271 * 0.224 *** 
 (0.109)  (0.124)  (0.153)  (0.078) 
 
DIV 0.127  0.273 
* 0.255 ** 0.163  
 (0.142)  (0.152)  (0.127)  (0.129) 
 
Herf3 –0.275 
** –0.191 ** –0.358 ** 0.257 ** 
 (0.138)  (0.082)  (0.161)  (0.111) 
 
SIZEPre-issue –0.161 
* –0.254  –0.217  0.138 
 
 (0.096)  (0.157)  (0.133)  (0.146) 
 
Issue characteristics 
  
        
DISC –0.416 ** –0.348 * –0.083 * –0.251  
 (0.199)  (0.211)  (0.049)  (0.207) 
 
DISC×BUYERController     –0.356 
***   
     (0.132)   
 
DISC×BUYERInstitution     0.268 
** 
 
 
     (0.130)   
 
UNDERStandby   0.242 
** 0.171 * 0.218 ** 
   (0.121)  (0.099)  (0.104) 
 
UNDERBest 0.228  0.205 
** 0.182 *  
 
 (0.141 ) (0.103)  (0.102)   
 
UNDERFull   –0.327 
** 0.137 *  
 
   (0.164)  (0.081)   
 
AUDIT 0.142  0.197 
* 0.183 * 0.092  
 (0.087)  (0.119)  (0.108)  (0.082) 
 
Size of offering –0.395 ** –0.364 ** 0.219 ** 0.174 ** 
 (0.163)  (0.161)  (0.087)  (0.085) 
 
FUSETech 0.498 
*** 0.492 *** 0.377 *** 0.462 *** 
 (0.151)  (0.124)  (0.139)  (0.138) 
 
FUSEFixed 0.482 
** 0.440 ** 0.501 *** 0.335 ** 
 (0.219)  (0.176)  (0.167)  (0.165) 
 
FUSEIntra –0.514 
** –0.518 ** –0.529 *** –0.354 ** 
 (0.216)  (0.253)  (0.175)  (0.169) 
 
FUSEDWC –0.523 
*** –0.478 ** –0.468 *** –0.413 * 
 (0.129)  (0.231)  (0.182)  (0.236) 
 
ΔDE –0.237 ** –0.212 ** –0.337 ** –0.144 * 
 (0.115)   (0.103)   (0.165)   (0.082) 
 
Security–specific characteristics       
 
  
TAKEUP 0.312 ***     
   
 (0.085)       
  
BUYER     –0.330 
** 
 
  
     (0.164   
  
RATE       0.081 
 * 
       (0.046)  
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       Observations  417 135 261 61  
R2 0.112 0.188 0.552 0.315  
F 2.767 1.840  4.852 1.896  
p–value 0.0003 0.0307  <0.01 0.0498  
 
Note: 
The table presents regression results where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the 5-day window 
around the issue announcement date, CAR [−2, +2]. The other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. F denotes the overall F statistic, which is used to test the overall significance of the regression model, with the 
null hypothesis that all of the regression coefficients are equal to zero. We control for year and industry effects using year 
and industry dummy variables in all the regressions.  
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two–sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 6 
Heckman Two–stage Regression Results of the Five–day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs [–2, +2]) 
around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method 
 
 Section A  Section B 
 First–stage Probit Regression with dependent 
variable = Pr(ISSUE) 
 Heckman Approach with Lambda  Included 
 Rights 
Issues 
 Open 
Offers 
 Private 
Placements 
 Convertible 
Issues 
 Rights 
Issues 
 Open 
Offers 
 Private 
Placements 
 Convertible 
Bond Issues 
 
Pre–issue characteristics 
MBpre-issue  
       –0.375 ** 0.434 **
* 
–0.255 * 0.155  
         (0.154)  (0.112)  (0.137)  (0.102)  
FCASTDiverg         0.115  0.196 
* 0.233  0.258 ** 
         (0.116)  (0.103)  (0.245)  (0.122)  
RUNUP         –0.258 ** 0.295 ** 0.127  0.228 ** 
         (0.126)  (0.144)  (0.079)  (0.104)  
DIV         0.219  0.158  0.281 ** 0.168  
         (0.136)  (0.142)  (0.136)  (0.235)  
Herf3    
     –0.264 ** –0.337 ** –0.365 ** 0.205 * 
         (0.114)  (0.166)  (0.174)  (0.106)  
SIZEPre-issue        
 –0.201 * –0.269 * –0.152  0.287  
         (0.115)  (0.164)  (0.204)  (0.196)  
Issue characteristics 
 
               
 
DISC         –0.316 ** –0.321  –0.113 * –0.058  
         (0.160)  (0.254)  (0.064)  (0.039)  
DISC×BUYERController            –0.386 
***   
             (0.093)    
DISC×BUYERInstitution            0.273 
*   
             (0.149)    
UNDERStandby           0.314 
*** 0.221 * 0.037 ** 
           (0.112)  (0.128)  (0.018)  
UNDERBest         0.382 
*** 0.296 *** 0.154 
* 
  
         (0.114)  (0.112)  (0.081) 
 
  
UNDERFull          
 –0.295 ** 0.149 **   
           (0.143)  (0.075)    
AUDIT         0.153  0.134  0.216  0.102  
         (0.121)  (0.109)  (0.173)  (0.085)  
Size of offering        –0.208 *** –0.249 *** 0.328 ** 0.275 ** 
         (0.069)  (0.032)  (0.164)  (0.136)  
FUSETech         0.423 
** 0.435 *** 0.361 ** 0.324 ** 
         (0.184)  (0.159)  (0.177)  (0.153)  
FUSEFixed         0.415 
** 0.354 *** 0.533 ** 0.361 * 
         (0.172)  (0.129)  (0.217)  (0.198)  
FUSEIntra         –0.571 
*** –0.514 *** –0.494 ** –0.275 ** 
         (0.195)  (0.177)  (0.251)  (0.133)  
FUSEDWC         –0.527 
*** –0.462 ** –0.408 * –0.346 * 
         (0.136)  (0.192)  (0.235)  (0.184)  
ΔDE         –0.216 * –0.236 ** –0.299 ** –0.137 * 
         (0.118)  (0.105)  (0.146)  (0.073)  
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Security–specific characteristics 
TAKEUP         0.341 **       
         (0.157)        
BUYER             –0.311 ***   
             (0.118)    
RATE               0.091 * 
               (0.056)  
Two-stage regression variables  
Volatility –0.253 ** 0.226 *** 0.327  –0.104          
 (0.115)  (0.084)  (0.214)  (0.132)          
Liquidity –0.246 ** –0.291 ** –0.228 ** –0.275 **         
 (0.118)  (0.145)  (0.114)  (0.128)          
CAR–150, –20 0.126  0.329 
** –0.327 *** 0.215          
 (0.084)  (0.138)  (0.111)  (0.146)          
MB –0.314 ** 0.228  0.219 * 0.268 **         
 (0.157)  (0.187)  (0.128)  (0.135)          
Leverage –0.108 * –0.343  –0.288  –0.233          
 (0.631)  (0.245)  (0.241)  (0.189)          
SIZE 0.214  0.286 * 0.298  0.303 **         
 (0.157)  (0.162)  (0.193)  (0.128)          
Managerial –0.229 * –0.268  0.319 *** 0.184          
ownership (0.132)  (0.203)  (0.082)  (0.127)          
Lambda         –0.264  –0.453  –0.243  –0.622  
         (0.163)  (0.298)  (0.172)  (0.460)  
                 
Observations 12,631  12,130  12,234  2640  387  118  259  51  
R2 0.017  0.031  0.012  0.130  0.129  0.143  0.646  0.443  
F 2.191  2.078  2.056  2.158  2.339  1.954  4.298  2.085  
p-value 0.032  0.042  0.044  0.035  0.002  0.020  <0.01  0.0345  
 
Note: 
The table presents results for the two-stage regression where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the 5-day window 
around the issue announcement date, CAR [−2, +2]. The variables for the first-stage regression are defined as follows. VOLAT is a stock’ 
market volatility measured by standard deviation of daily return over the preceding three months on the rolling basis; LIQ is a stock’ market 
liquidity defined as the relative bid–ask spread, which is measured by the dealer’s bid–ask spread divided by the average of the bid–price and 
the ask-price; CAR–150, –20, i, t is abnormal return between –150 and – 20 trading days on the rolling basis; MB is market–to–book ratio 
measured by the sum of total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity, divided by total assets; LEV is leverage 
measured by total liabilities divided by total assets; SIZE is firm size measured by natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalisation, 
adjusted by the inflation rate in the corresponding year; and MAN is managerial ownership measured by percentage of outstanding share 
owned by managers. The other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. We control for year and industry 
effects using year and industry dummy variables in all the regressions.  
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two–sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 7 
Regression Results of the Three–day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs [0, +2]) 
around the Issue Announcement Date by Issue Method 
 
Variable Rights Issues  Open 
Offers 
 Private 
Placements 
 Convertible  
Bond Issues 
 
Pre–issue characteristics 
MBPre-issue –0.293 
** 0.251 ** –0.219 * 0.104 * 
 (0.136)  (0.123)  (0.111)  (0.063)  
FCASTDiverg 0.129 
 0.177  0.154  0.187 * 
 (0.165)  (0.128)  (0.122)  (0.106)  
RUNUP –0.233 ** 0.219 ** 0.192  0.179 ** 
 (0.112)  (0.105)  (0.181)  (0.083)  
DIV 0.115  0.214 * 0.179 * 0.148  
 (0.098)  (0.113)  (0.094)  (0.283)  
Herf3 –0.327 
** –0.226 ** –0.396 ** 0.275 *** 
 (0.161)  (0.103)  (0.185)  (0.108)  
SIZEPre-issue –0.108 
 –0.205 * 0.141  –0.114  
 (0.126)  (0.120)  (0.192)  (0.098)  
Issue characteristics              
DISC –0.418 ** –0.369 ** –0.139) * –0.272  
 (0.204)  (0.175)  (0.082  (0.179)   
DISC×BUYERController  
   –0.402) ***    
     (0.159     
DISC×BUYERInstitution  
   0.362) **    
     (0.163    
UNDERStandby  
 0.327 ** 0.184) ** 0.219 ** 
   (0.154)  (0.082  (0.111)   
UNDERBest 0.237 
 0.256 ** 0.194) **    
 (0.165)  (0.125)  (0.096     
UNDERFull  
 –0.409 ** 0.283) *    
   (0.207)  (0.173    
Audit 0.192  0.214  0.216)  0.104  
 (0.123)  (0.158)  (0.277  (0.122)  
Size of offering –0.419 ** –0.493 *** 0.238) ** 0.241 ** 
 (0.195)  (0.112)  (0.114  (0.113)  
FUSETech 0.564 
*** 0.602 *** 0.468) *** 0.471 ** 
 (0.214)  (0.227)  (0.145  (0.235)  
FUSEFixed 0.587 
*** 0.613 *** 0.571) *** 0.383 ** 
 (0.205)  (0.202)  (0.119  (0.194)  
FUSEIntra –0.537 *** –0.697 *** –0.548) *** –0.365 ** 
 (0.124)  (0.243)  (0.209  (0.173)  
FUSEDWC –0.541 *** –0.536 ** –0.461) *** –0.427 ** 
 (0.102)  (0.234)  (0.280  (0.211)  
ΔDE –0.248 ** –0.239 ** –0.358) ** –0.186 * 
 (0.126)  (0.115)  (0.173  (0.097)  
Security–specific characteristics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TAKEUP 0.511 ***     
 (0.102)         
BUYER     –0.467 ***    
     (0.166)    
RATE       (0.158) * 
       0.089  
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Observations  393  124  276  58  
R2 0.125  0.151  0.638  0.494  
F 2.269  1.706  4.141  2.047  
p-value 0.003  0.049  <0.01  0.032  
 
Note: 
The table presents regression results where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the 3-day window 
around the issue announcement date, CAR[0, +2]. The other variables are defined in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. We control for year and industry effects using year and industry dummy variables in all the regressions. 
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance based on two–sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Table 8 
Regression Results of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs [–A1, X0])  
in the Offer Period by Issue Method 
 
Variable Rights Issues Open Offers Private Placements Convertible Issues 
     
Pre–issue characteristics          
MBpre-issue –0.128  0.147 
** –0.158  0.146 
 
 (0.159)  (0.062)  (0.108)  (0.138)  
FCASTdiverg –0.213 
* 0.175 * 0.285 * 0.275 ** 
 (0.124)  (0.102)  (0.173)  (0.137)  
RUNUP –0.273 ** 0.253 ** 0.124  0.217 
** 
 (0.124)  (0.119)  (0.111)  (0.104) 
 
4 
 
DIV 0.106  0.172 
* 0.283 ** 0.165  
 (0.113)  (0.103)  (0.139)  (0.123)  
Herf3 –0.269 
** –0.205 * –0.327 ** –0.269  
 (0.136)  (0.109)  (0.159)  (0.240)  
SIZEpre-issue –0.238  –0.102 
* –0.257 * 0.148  
 (0.178)  (0.067)  (0.146)  (0.098) 
 
Issue characteristics   
           
DISC –0.394 *** –0.207 * –0.160 * –0.174  
 (0.127)  (0.108)  (0.091)  (0.135) 
  
DISC× BUYERController     –0.215 
** 
 
  
     (0.087)   
  
DISC×BUYERInstitution     0.118 
** 
 
  
     (0.056)   
 
UNDERStandby   0.169 
** 0.193 * 0.384 ** 
   (0.071)  (0.102)  (0.185) 
  
UNDERBest 0.183  0.127 
* 0.219 **  
  
 (0.261 ) (0.069)  (0.102)   
  
UNDERFull   –0.282 
* 0.142 *  
  
   (0.162)  (0.083)  
 
 
AUDIT 0.273  0.258  0.114  0.062 
 
 (0.185)  (0.196)  (0.181)  (0.057) 
 
Size of offering –0.357 ** –0.336 ** 0.283 ** 0.232 ** 
 (0.168)  (0.159)  (0.121)  (0.114) 
 
FUSETech 0.524 
*** 0.411 ** 0.401 ** 0.438 ** 
 (0.196)  (0.167)  (0.176)  (0.175) 
 
FUSEFixed 0.491 
*** 0.415 ** 0.457 ** 0.505 * 
 (0.183)  (0.171)  (0.206)  (0.292) 
 
FUSEIntra –0.512 
** –0.431 ** –0.511 *** –0.426 ** 
 (0.253)  (0.213)  (0.162)  (0.214) 
 
FUSEDWC –0.435 
** –0.402 ** –0.457 *** –0.404 * 
 (0.182)  (0.197)  (0.135)  (0.217) 
 
ΔDE –0.123 * 0.238 ** 0.247 ** 0.311 * 
 (0.071)  (0.112)  (0.124)  (0.175) 
 
Security–specific characteristics 
  
    
  
    
TAKEUP 0.304 ***        
 (0.106)         
BUYER     –0.278 
** 
   
     (0.132)    
RATE       0.107 
       (0.102) 
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Observations 390 135 285 56  
R2 0.134 0.191 0.557 0.241  
F 3.195  1.743 4.602  1.938  
p-value <0.01  0.044 <0.01  0.048  
 
Note: 
The table presents regression results where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return over the window 
from the date before the offer period to the offer expiry date, inclusive, CAR[−A1, X0]. The other variables are defined 
in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. We control for year and industry effects using year and industry 
dummy variables in all the regressions.  
The sample consists of 1,659 eligible seasoned issues by listed firms in China between 1991 and 2010. 
*, ** and ***  denote statistical significance based on two–sided tests at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Seasoned offerings in China: 1991–2010 
 Rights Issues Open Offers Private Placements Convertible Bond Issues 
Year No. issues 
Mean 
(million 
yuan) 
Median 
(million 
yuan) 
No. 
issues 
Mean 
(million 
yuan) 
Median 
(million 
yuan) 
No. 
issues 
Mean 
(million 
yuan) 
Median 
(million 
yuan) 
No. 
issues 
Mean 
(million 
yuan) 
Median 
(million 
yuan) 
             
1991                2 124 124                   
1992 2 153 153                      
1993 72 113 75                      
1994 67 79.3 62 1 768 768                   
1995 68 78.9 59                      
1996 51 170 107                                    
1997 122 220 138    1 255 255                
1998 153 239 168 8 414 322                  2 175 175 
1999 119 237 180 5 1102 1240 2 242 242 1 1500 1500 
2000 176 319 230 18 876 745    2 1425 1425 
2001 85 375 300 20 898 772    4 1417 1406 
2002 20 269 232 28 588 532    5 830 800 
2003 25 271 231 17 683 510 1 42.8 42.8 16 1159 800 
2004 23 453 205 11 1452 708 2 1249 1249 12 1742 1225 
2005    5 5576 786 47 1921 600 3 1203 1034 
2006 3 384 219 7 1590 902 123 1599 600 7 627 430 
2007 7 3322 1207 24 2570 782 96 1500 704 10 795 460 
2008 8 1744 1561 34 1695 996 102 2000 829 5 1544 820 
2009 10 1060 559 14 1869 912 123 1743 780 6 777 785.5 
2010 17 7409 1030 9 2776 1000 1 5787 5787 8 10797 1600 
  Data source: GTA database, Guo Tai An Information Technology Company Ltd, 2011. 
  
